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COMMENTS AND LETTERS • NEWS AND NOTES • BOOK REVIEWS

REPORT ON THE POQ READERSHIP SURVEY

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Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs

OLE R. HOLSTI AND JAMES N. ROSENAU

SOME YEARS AGO Karl Mannheim suggested that generation is one of the more important factors shaping social beliefs and action. "The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individual with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of experiences, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action" (Mannheim, 1951:291). Mannheim's observation has not gone unheeded. In recent years the concept of generation has been central in such diverse studies as the political right in interwar Finland, a proposed new

Abstract American involvement in Vietnam and its attending domestic conflict have generated a good deal of speculation about generational differences and, more specifically, about the divergent "lessons" that Americans of different ages have drawn from the most salient foreign policy episodes they have experienced. The most visible lines of cleavage have quite often been described as falling between those whose views were shaped by the events leading up to World War II, on the one hand, and, on the other, those whose outlook has been molded by the war in Southeast Asia. Using data from questionnaire responses of 2,282 American leaders in various occupations, this article assesses the validity of the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" thesis. The findings indicate that the most salient cleavages on foreign policy exist *between* occupations and *within* generation, rather than vice versa. The article concludes with a discussion of the prospects for early achievement of domestic consensus on issues of international politics and American foreign policy.

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paradigm for the entire course of American history, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the political views of American students (Rintala, 1962; Huntington, 1974; Taylor and Wood, 1966; Lipset and Ladd, 1971). And as this concept's prominence in social research has grown, it has spawned a critical literature and several controversies.[1]

American involvement in Vietnam and its attending domestic conflict have generated a good deal of speculation about generational differences and, more specifically, about the divergent "lessons" that Americans of different ages have drawn from the most salient foreign policy episodes they have experienced. The most visible lines of cleavage have quite often been described as falling between those whose views were shaped by the events leading up to World War II, on the one hand, and, on the other, those whose outlook has been molded by the war in Southeast Asia.[2] The interpretation that links contemporary lack of consensus on matters of foreign policy to the "lessons" that each generation has adduced from dramatic and traumatic episodes has been summarized by the current White House National Security Adviser: "There is a tendency in America to be traumatized by international difficulties. The generation of the nineteen-forties was always thinking about the failure of the League of Nations. I'm talking about leadership groups now. The leadership of the sixties was always thinking about Munich. Now there is a generation worried by Vietnam, with consequences of self-imposed paralysis, which is likely to be costlier in the long run" (Brzezinski, quoted in Drew, 1978:116–17).

To be more specific, the thesis of the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" usually takes some variant of the following line of reasoning. Those who experienced the bitter fruits of appeasement and American isolationism during the 1930s tended to identify the Munich conference of 1938 as the paradigmatic example of how not to deal with expansionist totalitarian regimes. When faced after World War II with the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, the absence of hoped-for liberalization within the USSR, as well as periodic crises in Berlin and elsewhere, persons of this generation were prepared to support an active American foreign policy to meet challenges from the Soviet Union and its allies.

The argument goes on to suggest that persons of a more recent generation—for whom World War II and its genesis as well as the

[1] See especially Spitzer (1973).

[2] On generational cleavages, see Allison (1970–71), Roskin (1974), and Handberg (1972–73). Also useful on the effects of generation are Russett (1975), Bobrow and Cutler (1967), and Cutler (1970). For the importance of history as a source of "lessons," see May (1973), and Jervis (1976).

origins of the Cold War are merely a part of past history rather than episodes experienced firsthand—are more likely to look to the war in Southeast Asia as a source of guidance on the proper and improper conduct of foreign relations. According to this description of contemporary American society, then, what the fathers regard as indispensable commitments to maintain a viable world order, their sons view as indiscriminate undertakings against ill-defined—often phantom—threats that have little relationship to legitimate American interests, let alone the propagation or preservation of democratic institutions abroad.[3] This is, of course, a vastly oversimplified summary of an often complex argument. Nevertheless, even if it is something of a caricature, it does capture some central elements of the thesis that in important respects the cleavages on foreign policy issues in this country systematically pit the world views of one generation against those of another.

The generational argument, if valid, has some important implications for the future conduct of this nation's external relations because it suggests that members of the "Vietnam generation," as they achieve positions of leadership and influence during the next several decades, will bring to their roles an intellectual baggage radically different from that of the leaders they are replacing. If the generational hypothesis is valid, moreover, the prognosis is that as the next generation of leaders replaces those currently in positions of influence, a new consensus will emerge in the not-too-distant future. Recall that persons who had reached voting age at the time of the Munich conference are now in the seventh decade of their lives.

However plausible the generational interpretation of lack of consensus on matters of foreign policy may be, it is not universally accepted. Both survey and voting data suggest that, at least within the public at large, cleavages do not fall quite so neatly along age lines. Thus, the image of a dovish or neo-isolationist generation of students demonstrating on campuses to protest the excessive foreign policy commitments of their elders is, according to some observers, a skewed, if not inaccurate, picture of contemporary American society. For example, analysis of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll failed to reveal striking differences among age groups. Of those under the age of 30, 30 percent were classified as "liberal inter-

[3] An article on the African policy staff of the State Department described its leading members in this way: "The four are in the same age group—39–46—and they share a common experience of disillusionment with and then opposition to the Vietnam war. All remain highly skeptical about United States military involvement, direct and indirect, in areas where they feel the national interest is not obviously at stake." (Hovey, 1978:A3).

nationalists," 32 percent as "conservative internationalists," and 38 percent as "noninternationalists." Indeed, compared to the 30–64 and over-64 age groups, those of the youngest generation were the most evenly distributed among these three categories.[4]

Even the more specific proposition that ties generational conflict to the war in Vietnam receives little support from polls conducted during the decade prior to the Paris agreement of January 1973. Indeed, the polls revealed that, compared to their elders, the younger respondents were consistently more inclined to support American policy in Southeast Asia, as well as to oppose withdrawal (Erskine, 1970: 144–45; Converse and Schuman, 1970: 24; Mueller, 1973: 136–40; and Lunch and Sperlich, 1970: 32–34).

However, at least some advocates of the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" thesis suggest that, whatever may be true of the public at large, it describes accurately the cleavages among elites, actual and emerging (Allison, 1970–71). This paper examines the generational thesis in the light of evidence from a survey of persons who occupy positions of leadership in various types of institutions, or who are likely to do so in the future.

Data and Methods

The data are derived from a questionnaire mailed to a sample of American leaders in various walks of life.[5] The questionnaire focuses upon (but is not limited to) three clusters of items relating to this nation's experience in Vietnam: Diagnoses of the sources of American failure, predictions about the consequences of the United States intervention in Southeast Asia, and prescriptions or "lessons" of the conflict that should guide the future conduct of American foreign policy. Over 150 articles, speeches, editorials, interviews, and press conferences served as a major source of questionnaire items.

In addition to asking the respondents to assess the "lessons of Vietnam" and the sources and consequences of American lack of success in Southeast Asia, we probed for their general orientations toward foreign policy and domestic politics as well as data about their

[4] Percentages recalculated from the data that appear in Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979:Table 1).

[5] A fuller discussion of the questionnaire, the sources from which it was constructed, and the sample may be found in Holsti and Rosenau (1976). The present paper is one of a series in which we explore the continuing effects of the Vietnam experience on the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders. Analyses to date indicate that respondents' positions on the war are the best predictor of present policy beliefs, even on issues that have nothing to do with Vietnam. For an elaboration, see Holsti and Rosenau (1979a and 1979b).

personal backgrounds. To permit some cross-survey comparisons we included several questions that were also used in other recent surveys of American leaders. One multipart question on the goals and performance of American foreign policy is drawn from a study undertaken by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Rielly, 1975). Several of our questions also appear in the Harvard–*Washington Post* survey (Sussman, 1976). Two other questions were drawn from the recent Russett-Hanson study of business executives and military officers, and we included one question that also appears in the Barton study of 500 American leaders of major interest groups (Russett and Hanson, 1975; Barton, 1974–75).

We had initially hoped to construct our sample from a single source encompassing persons in a variety of top leadership and subleadership positions. Unfortunately, no single source met all our requirements. Thus, the sample was constructed in ways that represented several types of compromises between the ideal and reality.

A random drawing of 2,000 persons listed in the most recent edition of *Who's Who in America* provided one part of the sample. *Who's Who* is a useful source because it includes biographical material and addresses for each person. The probability of a completed questionnaire being returned was assumed to be greater if received at home rather than at an office. If received at home it was also less likely to be passed on to a subordinate or colleague for completion.

Who's Who in America is not without some significant drawbacks, however. First, some groups are very heavily represented, especially business executives and educators, whereas military officers, labor leaders, the clergy, media persons, and several other groups of interest are underrepresented. The age and sex distributions in *Who's Who in America* may accurately mirror the leadership structure of American society, but the limited representation of women and younger persons made it less than adequate, given our interest in those occupying subleadership roles who lived through the Vietnam War and who are likely to move into top positions in the near future.

The second part of our sample was constructed on the basis of quotas for leaders from each of important groups that are underrepresented in *Who's Who:* Foreign Service officers, labor leaders, politicians, clergy, foreign affairs experts outside government, media leaders, and women. Names and addresses were drawn from various sources using random sampling procedures whenever feasible. In several cases the populations of interest were sufficiently small that all members were included. For example, all 105 chief editorial writers of newspapers with a circulation exceeding 100,000 were selected, as were all presidents of state labor organizations.

One of the largest occupational groups in the sample consisted of almost 900 military personnel, including both senior officers (colonels, and general officers, and their naval equivalents) then serving in the Pentagon, and junior officers then attending a service school. These officers had already been identified by their branches of the service as persons likely to achieve significant leadership positions during their military careers.

The first mailing in February 1976 yielded 1,899 completed questionnaires out of a total of 4,290 sent. In order to preserve their anonymity, respondents were asked to return the questionnaire to one address (a stamped, addressed envelope was provided for this purpose), and a postal card (also provided) acknowledging its completion to another. Names of those returning the postal card were removed from the list for a follow-up mailing sent out in April, which brought in another 383 completed questionnaires. Very limited research funds precluded a third mailing to the remaining nonrespondents.[6]

Fifty-three percent, or 2,282 of the questionnaire recipients, completed and returned the survey instrument.[7] The return rate may have been adversely affected by the length of the questionnaire and the atmosphere of distrust toward social science surveys prevalent in recent years.[8] As a partial test of sample representativeness we compared responses to the two mailings. We assumed that those who had to be prodded a second time sufficiently resembled those who did not respond at all. If the 383 second-mailing respondents differed significantly from their 1,899 counterparts in the first mailing, concern that

[6] Early in the project we faced a choice between seeking external funds and making do with the very limited resources provided by the Duke University Research Council and the Institute for Transnational Studies at U.S.C. We selected the latter course because the sudden collapse of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975 lent some urgency to having a baseline for future surveys as near as possible to the end of the American undertaking in Vietnam.

[7] Russett and Hanson (1975:64), using a much shorter questionnaire, received returns from 54 percent of business executives who received questionnaires by mail, and from 69 percent of military officers who had the questionnaire distributed by military authorities at various war colleges. Russett and Hanson cite the 61 percent return rate achieved by Rosenau (1963) as the only leadership study with a higher figure.

[8] The Watergate scandal and revelations that illegal domestic surveillance activities by the FBI and CIA were not limited to the Nixon years have helped to create the atmosphere of distrust that has no doubt affected the return rate in all recent surveys. Several cases of highly unethical surveys indicate that distrust is not wholly unjustified. An especially notorious example occurred when *Finance Magazine* sponsored an alledgedly scholarly survey among international relations specialists, the results of which were then used to promote Richard Nixon for the Nobel Peace Prize. An episode revealing use of blatantly unethical techniques by commercial survey firms received wide publicity. On November 10, 1975, the *New York Times* summarized a longer report by Henry Gemmill, appearing in the *National Observer*, that was also picked up by a number of other major newspaper.

the sample was biased would have been heightened. In fact, we found little difference in the responses of the two groups. For example, of the 111 items summarized in Table 5, significant[9] response differences occurred on only two; one of the two items concerned Angola, where the conflict was essentially resolved during the two-month period between the two mailings.

In addition to age and occupational distributions (described below), the respondents can be characterized as: predominantly (90 percent) male,[10] highly educated (over 60 percent have earned graduate degrees), moderately liberal to moderately conservative in ideology (only 15 percent describe themselves as far left, very liberal, very

[9] Throughout this study we have adopted a moderately stringent standard for statistical tests. Results are reported as significant only if they exceed the .001 level.

[10] Public opinion polls suggest that sex might be an important intervening variable in the analysis of differences among generations (see, for example, Mueller, 1973:146–47; and Lunch and Sperlich, 1979:34–35). However, other studies seem to indicate that at the leadership level differences between men and women tend to diminish, if not disappear altogether (Rosenau, 1963:151, 181). The present survey includes 2,009 men and 224 women (the other 49 respondents failed to identify their sex). Analysis of the results by sex reveals relatively few differences. For example, of the 111 items summarized in Table 4, significant differences between men and women occurred on only 26. Two-way analyses of variance (sex and generation as the independent variables in the first, and sex and occupation as independent variables in the second) did not materially alter these results. In the first analysis, significant differences attributable to sex occurred in 28 of 111 items, and in the second analysis there were only 25 significant differences between men and women.

Moreover, the results do not support the view that women are consistently more optimistic, dovish, and more concerned with the social-economic-humanitarian aspects of foreign policy than with political/strategic goals. For example, men were more prone than women to view the USSR as expansionist, but these results were reversed when the question concerned China. And on the propositon that "any Communist victory is a defeat for America's national interests," men and women had identical mean scores.

In another analysis we constructed two different indexes for each of three distinct foreign policy belief systems. Contingency coefficients between sex and these indexes were quite consistently on the low side: Cold War Internationalism (.12 and .08), Post-Cold War Internationalism (.08 and .07), and Isolationism (.16 and .17). Only in the latter case does even a moderately pronounced pattern of sex differences emerge, with women the more isolationist.

Finally, we examined generational differences *within* sex groups. For example, do we find that the younger men and older women support a position that is opposed by older men and younger women? The answer is quite consistently negative. In a two-way analysis of variance with sex and generation as independent variables, among those items on which generational differences are significant, only about 5 percent reveal such a pattern. For example, younger men were more skeptical of détente than were the older ones, whereas the reverse tended to be true of women. But such differences were the exception rather than the rule. Of the 111 items discussed here, significant interaction effects occurred on only five, and on only one of these five did the pattern of responses within one sex group reverse that in the other.

These results would seem to indicate that aggregating the data for men and women in the present analysis will not dramatically affect the results.

conservative, or far right), and almost equally divided between Democrats (37 percent) and independents (34 percent), with a somewhat smaller representation of Republicans (27 percent).

To assess the effect of age on foreign policy beliefs, we divided the entire sample of 2,282 respondents into four groups based on the year of birth. In the absence of any standard guidelines for identifying generations, the designation of cutting points is a purely arbitrary decision based on two premises. First, we assumed that the three wars in which this nation has been involved since 1941 would provide significant benchmarks for dividing respondents into age groups. Note, moreover, that the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" thesis also identifies two of these wars as watershed points in American thinking about external affairs. The second premise is that late adolescence and young adulthood may have special significance for the respondent. Because this period encompasses for many the beginning of eligibility for military service, consciousness of and interest in foreign affairs may be enhanced when the prospect of personal involvement hinges upon the outcome of foreign policy undertakings. More generally, those years in the life cycle have often been identified as especially crucial in the formation and development of political beliefs.[11]

We used three cutting points—1923–24, 1932–33, and 1940–41—to divide the respondents into four groups. Thus, even the youngest of the World War II generation—those born in 1923—had reached at least the age of 18 when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II. By the end of that war they would, if otherwise eligible, have been likely to have military service. But even those who were not on active military duty (e.g., most women) could scarcely have lived through the war without having taken cognizance of it. Respondents born between 1924 and 1932 would at least have reached the age of 21 during some part of the Korean War. The older among them would also have been young adults during World War II, but we assumed that for this group the Korean War would have been an especially salient experience. Persons born between 1933 and 1940 would, if inducted into the armed forces, most likely have served during the period following the Korean armistice of 1953 and before the rapid escalation in 1965 of the Vietnam War. Hence this group is labeled the "Interim Generation." Finally, those born after 1940 have been designated as the "Vietnam Generation." Even

[11] Neumann (1942:235–36) has defined a political generation as all those who underwent essentially similar historical experiences during the crucial formative years between 17 and 25. The importance of this period in the life cycle is emphasized by many others, for example, Barber (1972).

the oldest persons in this group would have been only 13 years old when the fighting in Korea ended. Thus, we assumed that for them "the war" almost certainly refers to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The "World War II Generation" constitutes the largest part of our sample (39.4 percent of all respondents), followed by the "Vietnam Generation" (25.5 percent), the "Korea Generation" (19.4 percent), and the "Interim Generation" (11.2 percent). The remaining 4.5 percent did not state the year of birth.

In order to assess the impact of generation on foreign policy beliefs it would be desirable for each of the age groups to be as similar as possible with respect to other attributes that might serve as competing explanations, for example, occupation. For several reasons this is not the case here. Return rates were not uniform across all groups; they ranged from a low of 39 percent for labor leaders to figures approaching 60 percent for chief editorial writers, military officers, and educators. Some of the directories used to compile the mailing list did not provide birth dates, which prevented us from taking steps at the sampling stage to ensure an even distribution across generations. Moreover, the sociology of occupations is such that prominence or leadership positions tend to come earlier in some professions than in others. For example, business executives typically do not reach the top levels of management before an age (mid to late 50s) at which most senior military officers have already retired. Finally, our access to and a very high return rate from one of the middle level service schools resulted in a high proportion of military officers among the "Vietnam Generation."

As a consequence of such disparities among the four generational groups, simple comparisons across them may be misleading. Multivariate analyses reported in the next section assess the impact of generation in conjunction with occupation. The occupational classification includes 10 categories: Military officers ($N=500$), business executives (294), lawyers (116), clergy (101), Foreign Service officers (125), labor leaders (74), public officials (110), educators (565), leaders in the printed and electronic media (184), and "others" (213).

Findings

The questionnaire has two clusters of items that are especially relevant to the generational explanation of foreign policy cleavages. The first cluster asks respondents to rate the importance of 18 foreign policy goals, ranging from combating world hunger to containing communism. The second cluster, focusing on the "lessons" that

should be drawn from the American experience in Vietnam, included 34 items concerning the international system, adversaries, the appropriate international role for the United States, the formulation and instruments of foreign policy, and the proper uses of the past. These 52 items thus encompass many of the key beliefs that allegedly distinguish the older from the younger members of contemporary leadership groups.[12]

Following the reasoning of the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" thesis, we have elsewhere spelled out a number of hypotheses linking age to foreign policy beliefs (Holsti and Rosenau, 1976). To summarize briefly, they indicated that, compared to older respondents, the younger leaders would be more inclined to:

Attribute greater importance to economic-humanitarian foreign policy goals, and less to strategic/political ones.
Place emphasis on international cooperation, especially through international organizations.
Perceive a pluralistic international system, rather than a tight bipolar system that is dominated by a zero-sum view of conflict.
Perceive other nations, especially potential adversaries, as nationalistic rather than inherently expansionist.
Prescribe a reduced international role for the United States, especially with respect to military-strategic issues and Third World conflicts.
Support steps to demilitarize, decentralize, and democratize the formulation of American foreign policy.
Question the value and utility of military instruments of foreign policy.

The results summarized in Tables 1 and 2 provide only modest support for the generational hypothesis. When occupation is controlled, the effects of age tend to decline or even to disappear. Or, to restate this in the language of analysis of variance, the results suggest that differences within generations are often more substantial than those between generations. Thus, when leaders in our sample are classified not only by age but also according to occupation, the latter variable consistently accounts for most of the differences among them.

Moreover, although generational effects are in some cases significant, an inspection of the underlying data reveals that the pattern of differences does not always conform to the substance of the "Munich generation versus Vietnam generation" thesis. An analysis confined to items in Tables 1 and 2 that yielded significant differences across age groups uncovers some support for the generational hypothesis, but it is by no means consistent. For example, in 8 of 10 occupational

[12] Compare these items, for example, with the "axioms" that Allison (1970–71) or Roskin (1974) cite as the key differences among generations.

Table 1. The Generational Hypothesis on American Foreign Policy: A Test Based on the Responses of 2,282 American Leaders to Proposed Foreign Policy Goals

Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal.	*Significant (+), Nonsignificant (0) Differences (.001 level) Between:* [a]	
	Generations	*Occupations*
Maintaining a balance of power among nations	+	+
Defending our allies' security	0	+
Containing communism	+	+
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us	+	+
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	0	+
Securing adequate supplies of energy	0	+
Protecting the jobs of American workers	0	+
Protecting the interests of American business abroad	0	+
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy	0	+
Combating world hunger	0	+
Helping solve world inflation	+	0
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries	0	+
Strengthening the United Nations	+	+
Keeping peace in the world	0	0
Worldwide arms control	0	+
Promoting and defending our own security	0	+
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	0	+
Promoting the development of capitalism abroad	0	+

[a] Results based on two-way analysis of variance.

groups, the youngest respondents were the least inclined to attribute importance to the containment of communism (exception: public officials, "others"), but in only 4 of 10 occupational groups did those of the Vietnam generation register the lowest rating on the somewhat related goal of maintaining a global balance of power. On the goal of "fostering international cooperation to solve common problems," the youngest respondents provided the highest importance rating in some occupations (clergy, military, media, lawyers), and the lowest in others (Foreign Service officers, business executives, "others").

A similarly mixed pattern emerges from the items on the appropriate "lessons" of Vietnam. On questions concerning the nature of the contemporary international system, respondents of the Vietnam generation were, within their occupations, often among the most inclined to cast doubts on the Cold War premises of a tight bipolar system. However, other questions gave rise to much less clearcut results. An item on the importance of involving the United Nations in the resolution of international disputes found members of the youngest genera-

Table 2. The Generational Hypothesis on American Foreign Policy: A Test Based on the Responses of 2,282 American Leaders to Proposed "Lessons" of Vietnam

This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.	*Significant (+), Nonsignificant (0) Differences (.001 level) Between:*[a]	
	Generations	*Occupations*
The International System		
A nation will pay a heavy price if it honors its alliance commitments only selectively	+	+
There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path	+	+
Revolutionary forces in "Third World" countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the USSR or China	+	+
Any Commun victory is a defeat for America's national interest	+	+
American foreign policy should be based on the premise that the Communist bloc is irreparably fragmented	+	+
Adversaries		
The Soviet Union is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals	+	+
Détente permits the USSR to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict	0	+
China is generally expansionist rather defensive in its foreign policy goals	0	+
The Role of the United States		
The best way to encourage democratic development in the "Third World" is for the U.S. to solve its own problems	+	0
Stationing American troops in other countries encourages them to let us do their fighting for those countries	0	+
America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down	0	+
Military aid programs will eventually draw the United States into unnecessary wars	+	+
It was a serious mistake to agree to locate American technicians in the Sinai	0	+
The U.S. should avoid any involvement in the Angolan civil war	0	+
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling international disputes	+	+
The U.S. should undertake military intervention in the Middle East in case of another oil embargo	0	+
Vital interests of the U.S. are largely confined to western Europe, Japan and the Americas	0	0
Making American Foreign Policy		
Americans have relied too much on presidents to define the national interest	0	+

Table 2. (continued)

	Significant (+), Nonsignificant (0) Differences (.001 level) Between:[a]	
	Generations	*Occupations*
The press is more likely than the government to report the truth about the conduct of foreign policy	+	+
The conduct of American foreign affairs relies excessively on military advice	+	+
Weak allies excessively influence U.S. foreign policy	0	0
An effective foreign policy is impossible when the Executive and Congress are unable to cooperate	+	+
The American people lack the patience for foreign policy undertakings that offer little prospect of success in the short run	0	+
Americans lack an understanding of the role that power plays in world politics	0	+
Limited war cannot be conducted successfully because of constraints imposed by the American political system	+	+
The freedom to dissent at home inhibits the effective conduct of American foreign policy	0	+
The Instruments of Foreign Policy		
If foreign interventions are undertaken, the necessary force should be applied in a short period of time rather than through a policy of graduated escalation	+	+
The U.S. should never try to get by with half measures: we should apply necessary power if we have it	0	+
Rather than simply countering our opponent's thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of the opponent's power	0	+
When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application	0	+
The efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining	0	0
Limited wars should be fought with air power so as to avoid introducing American ground troops	0	+
The Uses of the Past		
If officials would treat each new crisis on its own merits, rather than relying on past experience, they would usually make better foreign policy decisions	0	+
It is best to forget the foreign policy mistakes of the past as quickly as possible	0	+

[a] Results based on two-way analysis of variance.

tion in strongest agreement within three occupations (labor, educators, clergy), and those of the oldest age groups in greatest agreement in six others (Foreign Service officers, business executives, military officers, public officials, lawyers, and "others"). The proposition that

American influence in the Third World could best be exercised by solving our own problems yielded equally mixed results. Among the media leaders and military officers, the youngest respondents were most fully in agreement, but they were also the most opposed in three other occupations (business, labor, and clergy).

A more detailed examination of eight key propositions that seem most fully to capture the different world views often ascribed to the older and younger generations reveals more clearly the nature of cleavages among our respondents. The first six items in Table 3 depict a bipolar world in which the United States has primary responsibilities for coping with a variety of threats from implacable enemies. The remaining two propositions are usually included high on lists identifying the "lessons of Vietnam" allegedly espoused by the younger generation. When respondents are classified into 40 subgroups (4 generations × 10 occupations), evidence of some generational differences does emerge. For example, subgroups of the World War II generation appear 11 times in the lefthand column (strongest Cold War position), but contrary to the generational hypothesis, they are also found three times in the righthand column: Educators of the oldest age group were among the least supportive of the proposition that the United States should use all means to oppose communism, and they favored a scaled-down international role for this country. Similarly, media leaders of the World War II generation strongly opposed intervention in the Middle East in case of another oil embargo. Subgroups of the Vietnam generation appear 6 times in the lefthand column and 19 in the right.

Compared to this moderate support for the generational hypothesis, a much more consistent pattern emerges from the data on the occupational status of the strongest and weakest supporters of the Cold War positions. Military officers and business executives, and not only those of the older generation, provide the strongest support for the Cold War positions—together they account for 34 of the 42 entries in the lefthand column of Table 3—whereas media leaders and educators are almost equally pronounced in their skepticism, accounting for 26 of the 40 subgroups in the righthand column. Stated somewhat differently, cases in which cross-pressures may be assumed to be at work—for example, media leaders or educators of the World War II generation, or military officers and business executives of the Vietnam generation—occupation clearly tends to override age.

It is appropriate to inquire, however, whether the results for these items are representative of the main tendencies within the much larger set of items in the study. Table 4 summarizes the findings for 111 items (including those already described in Tables 1–3) concerning:

Table 3. Strongest and Weakest Support for Selected Foreign Policy Propositions Among 2,282 Respondents Classified into 40 Subgroups (4 Generations × 10 Occupations)

	Subgroups with Strongest Cold War Positions			*Subgroups with Weakest Cold War Positions*		
	Occupation	*Generation*	*Mean Score*	*Occupation*	*Generation*	*Mean[a] Score*
There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will follow a similar path	Military	W. W. II	0.73	Media	Vietnam	−0.22
	Military	Korea	0.67	Media	Korea	−0.18
	Military	Interim	0.59	Foreign Svc.	Vietnam	−0.17
	Military	Vietnam	0.55	Clergy	Vietnam	−0.15
	Business	W. W. II	0.50	Media	Interim	−0.14
	Business	Interim	0.50			
Any Communist victory is a defeat for America's national interest	Military	W. W. II	0.38	Media	Vietnam	−0.59
	Military	Korea	0.32	Media	Interim	−0.50
	Military	Interim	0.29	Media	Korea	−0.50
	Clergy	W. W. II	0.21	Educators	Vietnam	−0.50
	Business	Interim	0.12	Educators	Korea	−0.47
The Soviet Union is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals	Military	Korea	0.78	Educators	Vietnam	0.18
	Military	Interim	0.78	Clergy	Vietnam	0.22
	Business	Interim	0.74	Labor	Interim	0.22
	Clergy	W. W. II	0.74	Clergy	Interim	0.23
	Military	Vietnam	0.71	Media	Vietnam	0.32
Détente permits the USSR to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict	Military	W. W. II	0.61	Public off.	Interim	−0.27
	Military	Interim	0.52	Foreign Svc.	Vietnam	−0.20
	Military	Vietnam	0.43	Clergy	Vietnam	−0.18
	Clergy	W. W. II	0.40	Lawyers	Interim	−0.17
	Military	Korea	0.31	Educators	Vietnam	−0.16
The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of communism	Military	Interim	0.29	Media	Korea	−0.74
	Military	W. W. II	0.23	Media	Vietnam	−0.65
	Military	Korea	0.14	Educators	Vietnam	−0.65
	Military	Vietnam	0.05	Educators	W. W. II	−0.54
	Clergy	Interim	−0.14	Foreign Svc.	Vietnam	−0.54
The U.S. should undertake military intervention in the Middle East in case of another oil embargo	Business	Vietnam	−0.13	Media	Korea	−0.87
	Business	Interim	−0.15	Foreign Svc.	Interim	−0.74
	Clergy	Interim	−0.18	Media	Vietnam	−0.70
	Military	Interim	−0.19	Media	W. W. II	−0.70
	Military	Korea	−0.28	Media	Interim	−0.67

Table 3. (continued)

	Subgroups with Strongest Cold War Positions			*Subgroups with Weakest Cold War Postions*		
	Occupation	*Genera-tion*	*Mean[a] Score*	*Occupation*	*Genera-tion*	*Mean[a] Score*
Revolutionary forces in Third World countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the USSR or China	Military	W. W. II	−0.25	Public off.	Interim	0.60
	Clergy	W. W. II	−0.09	Educators	Vietnam	0.56
	Business	Korea	−0.08	Foreign Svc.	Vietnam	0.50
	Military	Interim	−0.04	Educators	Interim	0.50
	Clergy	Korea	−0.04	Media	Korea	0.48
America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down	Military	Vietnam	−0.30	Labor	Korea	0.43
	Military	Korea	−0.28	Educators	Korea	0.29
	Military	W. W. II	−0.27	Media	Vietnam	0.27
	Military	Interim	−0.21	Educators	Vietnam	0.26
	Business	Interim	−0.15	Educators	W. W. II	0.25
	Labor	Interim	−0.15			
Summary: Number of Appearances in Each Column						
Occupations	Military		26	Military		0
	Business		8	Business		0
	Clergy		7	Clergy		4
	Labor		1	Labor		2
	Lawyers		0	Lawyers		1
	Public off.		0	Public off.		2
	Foreign Svc.		0	Foreign Svc.		5
	Educators		0	Educators		11
	Media		0	Media		15
Generations	W. W. II		11	W. W. II		3
	Korea		9	Korea		8
	Interim		16	Interim		10
	Vietnam		6	Vietnam		19

[a] Mean scores recorded on a scale of 1.00 (strongly agree) to −1.00 (strongly disagree).

the sources of failure in Vietnam (21 items), consequences of the war in Southeast Asia (13), the "lessons" of Vietnam (34), goals of American foreign policy (18), the appropriate international role for the United States (7), and appraisals of current foreign policy performance (18). The results are very much in line with those reported above. Two-way analyses of variance with generation and occupation as explanatory variables reveal significant effects of the latter for 100

Table 4. The Generational Hypothesis on American Foreign Policy: A Comparison Based on the Responses of 2,282 American Leaders, Classified According to Age and Occupation

	Total No. of Items	*Number of Items with Significant Differences (.001 level) Between:*[a]	
		Generations	*Occupations*
Goals of American Foreign Policy (Table 1)	18	5	16
"Lessons" of Vietnam (Table 2)			
The international system	5	5	5
U.S. adversaries	3	1	3
Role of the United States	9	3	7
Making American foreign policy	9	4	8
Instruments of foreign policy	6	1	5
Uses of the past in foreign policy making	2	0	2
Sources of failure in Vietnam			
Actions of others	3	3	3
Vietnam was an unsound undertaking	2	0	2
Military factors	4	3	4
Domestic constraints on U.S. policy	5	2	5
Lack of knowledge and understanding	3	0	3
Others	4	2	3
Consequences of Vietnam War			
Impact on the international system	3	1	3
U.S. adversaries encouraged	2	2	2
Constraints on future U.S. policy	2	0	1
Types of future U.S. undertakings	3	3	3
Damage to American society	3	0	2
The U.S. international role	7	1	7
Rating U.S. foreign policy performance	18	5	16
Totals	111	41	100

[a] Results based on two-way analysis of variance. Interaction effects between generation and occupation significant for none of the 111 items.

of the 111 questionnaire items, compared to only 41 of 111 for the former. It should be reiterated, moreover, that even when generational differences yielded statistically significant results, the underlying scores did not uniformly fit the pattern of a "hawkish-internationalist" older group versus a "dovish-neoisolationist" younger cohort.

Finally, for each of the 34 items concerning the "lessons" of Vietnam we also asked the leaders in our sample to indicate "the extent to which your position was influenced by the Vietnam conflict." The generational hypothesis would seem to imply that the younger age cohort should have been more significantly affected by Vietnam, whereas those of the older generation, whose experiences

included additional dramatic or traumatic foreign policy episodes, should have been less affected. The data for these 34 items provide only moderate support for this line of reasoning. Significant generational differences appeared for only 12 "lessons," compared to 21 for the occupation variable. And, once again, the underlying scores indicate that the direction of differences is only moderately consistent with the generational hypothesis. For example, among educators and business executives there was a rather marked tendency for members of the Vietnam generation to indicate that the war had influenced their positions, but this was much less often the case for labor leaders and Foreign Service officers.

Conclusion

These findings provide a relatively narrow base from which to draw broad conclusions about political generations. While they ought not to be construed as undermining the recent interest in generational explanations of political conflict and change, the results do raise some questions about a narrower but nevertheless important point—the oft-repeated assertion that the cleavages created by the Vietnam conflict are essentially generational in nature. That argument received only modest support from our data. In contrast to classifying the respondents by occupation, dividing them into four age groups did not consistently bring forth striking differences. Multivariate analyses indicated that, with few exceptions, generation proved to be a much less potent explanation than occupation. Moreover, even when differences among generations survived various statistical tests, the pattern of differences did not always conform to the substance of the argument put forward in some recent discussions of generational cleavages in this country.

In searching for ways to explain these results, one line of inquiry might be to look for potential methodological problems. Perhaps the rules used to define generations and the rationale for their choice were inadequate. This may be true and there has been no effort to justify the selected cutting points as the last word on the matter. However, analyses that divided the data in some alternative ways did not give rise to greatly different findings that would sustain more strongly the generational hypothesis.[13]

Second, the results may reflect the fact that the sample did not adequately represent the very youngest members of the "Vietnam

[13] For example, dividing the respondents by decade of birth did not yield striking generational differences beyond those reported here. Further evidence on this point is available from one of the authors (ORH).

generation"—those who were of college age during the conflict. Of the 583 in that age group, only 262 were born in 1946 and later.[14] There is no way of determining the extent to which these results would have been altered by inclusion of more respondents under the age of 30—or perhaps even under the age of 25—at the time that the questionnaire was filled out. In any case, whatever the desirability of having a different age structure for our sample, there were some practical barriers to doing so. The key problem is that persons in leadership positions are rarely very young, and it is not always possible for the outside investigator to identify even a pool of younger persons from which future leaders are likely to be selected. The military stand out as one exception because the system of service schools allows one to sample officers who have been identified as "comers." But many occupations lack a similarly visible system that can be used by outsiders for research purposes. Indeed, for some occupations it was extremely difficult to find useful and current lists of persons holding any leadership positions, much less leaders of a specific age group. This was the case, for example, with labor leaders.

If we assume that these results are not merely a reflection of problems in cutting points between generations and sampling, we are led to a still different explanation—the concept of generation itself. Categories based on date of birth incorporate some simplifying assumptions that are at least open to debate. The premise that there is a single stage in the life cycle at which all persons become politically conscious—and therefore become receptive to the "lessons" driven home by contemporary events—may be generally valid. But the assumption that even dramatic events will be interpreted in the same way by all members of an age group, with the consequence that the same lessons will be adduced, seems implausible. Moreover, generational identification, by itself, carries a relatively modest load of additional information that might be used to predict one's political beliefs. The task is easier if the generations in question are widely separated. For example, it would be easy to predict that persons born in 1390 would believe that a flat world was at the center of the universe, whereas those born in 1930 would not. Predicting other information on the basis of age alone is much more difficult when virtually all respondents were born within the first half of this century.

When compared to occupation the limitations of generation as an explanatory variable become clearer. Unlike age alone, occupation

[14] A separate analysis of these 262 respondents would have been significantly affected by the high proportion of military officers among them.

also provides a number of clues about other experiences that may affect political beliefs. For example, if we know that a person is a lawyer, military officer, Foreign Service officer, physician, or labor leader, we can also make some better-than-random guesses about some other types of socializing influences—education, memberships, professional norms, and the like.

If these results reflect accurately the state of contemporary leadership beliefs, they provide some insight into the prospects for early achievement of consensus on issues of international politics and American foreign policy. One need hardly undertake an extensive survey to recognize that, whatever consensus may have existed during the two decades after World War II, it has been shattered, or to judge as less than totally successful efforts of the last three administrations to reconstruct a new consensus around such concepts as détente or global human rights.

The generational hypothesis leads to some optimism on this score.[15] It presumes that replacement of one leadership group with those of the next generation will result in a new consensus that reflects the shared experiences—and therefore the common dispositions and world views—of the ascending leadership group, in this case, the Vietnam generation. Time, in short, will be the great healer and unifier.

However, the findings do not warrant such optimism. They suggest a rather different scenario, featuring continuing cleavages among American leadership groups arising, in turn, from substantial differences on many critical foreign policy issues *within* generations. In other words, the data suggest that, barring a unifying event of dramatic proportions—for example, another Pearl Harbor—the current ferment and lack of consensus in this country may persist well beyond the passing from the scene of those who lived through World War II. Impressionistic evidence suggests that even the brutal invasion of Afghanistan has not created such a consensus.

[15] This is not to say that proponents of the generational hypothesis necessarily applaud the prospective succession of "Vietnam generation" to positions of leadership in the United States. Russett (1975:19–21) concludes that the putative neo-isolationism of this age cohort will serve poorly at a time when the agenda of international social-economic-environmental problems will require greater rather than less recognition of interdependence. A more general fear is well summarized in Roskin's observation that leaders of each generation, "formed by the dramatic experiences of their young adulthood . . . come to power and eventually misapply the lessons of their youth" (Roskin, 1974:365).

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Changes in Family Life in Middletown, 1924–77

HOWARD M. BAHR

THIS PAPER compares selected characteristics of family life as described by high school students in 1924 and in 1977. It is a replication of portions of the research conducted in the midwestern city of Middletown by Robert and Helen Lynd and described in their widely acclaimed community studies, *Middletown* (1929) and *Middletown in Transition* (1937). It is based on data collected as part of restudy of Middletown currently underway.[1]

The Lynds' Views About Modernization and Family Life

Much of *Middletown* was about how the city had changed since 1890, and there were numerous comments on the apparent direction of existing trends. In a chapter entitled "Child-rearing" it was argued

[1] An earlier report, on changes in student attitudes, appeared in Caplow and Bahr (1979). Additional details about research methods and sampling are available there.

Abstract Characteristics of family life described by Middletown high school students in 1924 and reported in Robert and Helen Lynd's *Middletown* are contrasted with data from students interviewed in 1977. Comparisons of students' responses suggest that there has been an attenuation of certain family functions and an enhancement of others. The 1977 students were more likely to earn their own spending money and less likely to receive their sex education from their parents; and females were more likely to spend evenings away from home. There were changes in definitions of women's roles, and the range of desirable parental characteristics had narrowed to focus on direct parent-child relationships of an emotional or expressive nature. Analysis of reported topics of disagreement suggest that the generation gap in 1977 is no wider than it was in 1924.

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that the role of the home in the socialization of the young was declining: "Even from the earliest years of the child's life the former dominance of the home is challenged" (1929:133). This decline in the home's influence was seen in the smaller size of contemporary yards, the advent of community playgrounds which provided an alternative to home play, the passing of the parental role in occupational training, and, in response to growing numbers of working mothers among the working class, the assumption by institutions of the community of many former parental functions. The attrition of family functions was especially noticeable in the lives of teenage children, the Lynds said, for "the agencies drawing the child away from the home multiply," and there was an increasing problem of generational conflict over "early sophistication" and the precocious independence of the young. They described the strains upon the family with findings about, among other things, the sources of young people's spending money, the number of evenings per week they spent at home, and causes of family disagreement.

The Lynds' perspectives on the influence of secularization (or modernization) upon the family parallel Ogburn's (1933) later description of the loss of family functions. Since Ogburn's time, the accepted theoretical stance has changed from an emphasis upon loss to a concern with relative predominance or specialization of family function. Adams refers to the ongoing process as the "expansion and spatial separation" from the nuclear family of functions formerly concentrated there (Adams, 1975:77, 94–45). It is recognized that the family has either lost or experienced an attenuation of many of the functions formerly located within it. At the same time, at least one function—that of meeting emotional needs—seems to have become more salient to the nuclear family: "The family has become a specialist in gratifying people's psychological needs—needs for understanding, affection, and happiness" (Adams, 1975:95).

The idea that along with an increased rate of social change came a growing gap between parents and youth was a foreshadowing of the modern notion of the generation gap. However, the Lynds (1929:146) recognized that the trends were not all unidirectional: "Despite the difficulty of holding children to established sanctions and the shifting of the sanctions themselves, not all of the currents in the community are set in the direction of widening the gap between parents and children."

Nevertheless, a decade later (1937:168) they reaffirmed their view that the general trend was toward increased generational cleavage:

> Adult-imposed restraints of obedience to parents, school, and public opinion have weakened further as the adult world has crumbled under the depres-

sion. A leading local minister says the disillusionment apparent today among many of the young with the adult world and its values "began early in the depression." "These kids in high school and out at the college know what's going on," remarked a businessman. "They see a lot of the inadequacies in the present setup, and many of them want to buck over the traces."

Although no new survey data had been collected from Middletown's young people as part of the work for *Middletown in Transition*, the Lynds argued (1937:168) that the gap in attitudes between the parents and their children had widened: "The gap between the purposes and mutual understanding of parents and children noted in 1925 has apparently widened still further. One got the impression in 1935 of a more self-conscious subculture of the young in Middletown." We do not have longitudinal data to trace the perceptions of generational cleavage in the decades between 1924 and the present, but our 1977 high school survey makes possible a 50-year comparison.

The 1924 Survey

The Lynds completed two questionnaire surveys of high school students in Middletown. One instrument, a questionnaire on "the life of the high school population" was administered in all high school sophomore, junior, and senior English classes. The Lynds reported (1929:509) that the "between 700 and 800 boys and girls" who participated represented about three-fourths of the student population (they were not more specific than that about total completion rates, although for specific items exact *N*'s are given). The second questionnaire used by the Lynds, consisting primarily of true-false attitude items, was administered to juniors and seniors in social science classes. Because the items relevant to family characteristics all appeared in the lengthier "high school life" questionnaire, the comparisons treated in the present paper all use data from that survey. Changes in student attitudes as found in comparisons between the Lynds' true-false questionnaires and our 1977 survey have been reported in a previous paper (Caplow and Bahr, 1979).

The Lynds' high school life questionnaire contained questions on a variety of subjects, including occupational and educational aspirations, high school activities, leisure pursuits, church participation, extracurricular reading, employment, personal expenses, and several items about home life and perceptions of parents. Specific items on which statistical breakdowns were published, thereby making possible comparisons between the Lynds' findings and our own,[2] include the

[2] The original questionnaires seem to have been destroyed. In the Lynd papers at the Library of Congress there is a note in Robert Lynd's handwriting instructing that they

following: sources of parent-child disagreement; evening time spent at home; perceptions of the qualities most desirable in parents; sources of spending money; and sources of information about "sex matters."

The Replication

The 1977 questionnaire, titled "School Experience, Occupational Plans, Family Background, and Attitudes of Middletown High School Youths," was eight pages long, and included large portions of both Lynd questionnaires and some additional items about school life, occupational aspirations, and family background. It was designed to fit into a 50-minute class period, but in at least one high school, the allowed time was less and some students had difficulty completing the form.

The survey of high school students was conducted in all four of Middletown's high schools during the winter of 1977, preceded by negotiations with school officials and a formal letter to parents informing them of the project and its purposes. The questionnaire was administered by teachers in each school, who received written instructions. It was offered at a given hour to all students then in school; 3,257 completed instruments were obtained from an estimated total population of 4,000. Students in special education classes were excluded by a decision of school officials.

The present analysis is based on a 50 percent random sample of the questionnaires (1,673 cases). Ninth-grade students, present in our sample but not in the Lynds', were eliminated from the tabulations for this paper, as were black students, who were included in their sample but not in their tabulation. After deleting these "ineligible" cases, the maximum number of cases available for the present analysis was 999.

Findings

The discussion of differences between student responses in 1924 and 1977 is organized around the two propositions about modernization and family change derived from the Lynds' analysis, namely: (1) that the trend of attrition and attenuation of family functions has continued, and (2) that the forces producing intergenerational cleav-

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be disposed of, and only sample copies survive. Accordingly, comparisons are not possible for items which do not receive detailed treatment in the Lynds' published work. Examples of items in their questionnaire for which statistical distributions are not available in the *Middletown* volumes are number of hours spent having a good time in the company of parents, number of meals eaten at home, and the query: "List what you did between breakfast and bed-time the last 2 Sundays."

age continue to operate. In other words, we expected to find that the family is less central in the lives of Middletown youth of 1977 than it was in 1924, and that parent-youth disagreement continues at least on a comparable level. The findings are summarized under three general headings: family influences on student time and money, family and sex education, and student perceptions of parents.

FAMILY INFLUENCES ON STUDENT TIME AND MONEY

Evenings spent at home. Unlike the other items to be considered, the question on evening time spent at home was a simple count and did not include detail on the nature or location of the evening activities which drew young people away from the home.

The modernization/family attenuation proposition yields the prediction that the 1977 respondents were away from home significantly more than were their 1924 counterparts. As may be seen in Table 1, for the male students the 1924–77 differences are not significant: boys in 1977 were no more apt to spend their evenings away from home than were boys in 1924. For the female students, however, the difference is in the predicted direction, with the 1977 high school girls almost twice as apt to be gone from home at least five nights a week (26 percent of the 1924 girls reported only 0–2 evenings at home in the week preceding the survey, compared to 46 percent of the 1977 girls) and the number of girls home at least five nights a week significantly higher in 1924 (38 percent, compared to 25 percent in 1977). These

Table 1. Student Reports[a] of Evenings Spent at Home During the Past Week, by Sex, 1924 and 1977

Number of Evenings at Home in Past Week	*Males*		*Females*		
	1924[b]	*1977*	*1924*[b]		*1977*
0	19%	24%	5%	*	18%
1	11	11	9		12
2	12	12	12		16
3	13	15	18		14
4	15	12	18		15
5	14	12	19		10
6	9	4	11		6
7	7	10	8		9
Total	100%	100%	100%		100%
Number of cases (*N*)	(396)	(422)	(458)		(485)

[a] In both surveys the question was worded, "How many evenings in the past seven have you been home all evening from supper to bedtime?"

[b] Lynd and Lynd, 1929:135.

* Percentage differences between adjoining columns statistically significant at the .01 level.

results suggest that by 1924 the male students had reached a level of independence from home approximately equal to that of the 1977 students. If some family functions were less centered in the nuclear family in 1977 than in 1924, they seem to have affected the male students' physical presence at home very little. In contrast, whatever factors have operated to draw students away from the home in the evenings have had an increasing effect on female students, such that they are much less likely to spend evenings at home than they were in 1924.

What has happened, as becomes clear when the differences in the distribution of evenings at home for boys and girls in 1924 is compared with the sex differences in 1977, is that in 1924 there was a significant difference between the sexes, with boys more likely to spend evenings away from home. By 1977, this difference had disappeared. In 1924 males were almost four times as likely to be away from home every evening of the week as were female students (19 percent, compared to 5 percent); by 1977 the males still had a slight edge in proportion away from home every night (24 percent versus 18 percent for the girls) but the females were more likely than the males to be away from home five or six nights a week (28 percent versus 23 percent for the males) and the proportions of students home most of the time (5 to 7 nights a week) was the same for both sexes (26 percent for males and 25 percent for females).

Apparently the forces pulling young people out of the home have operated differentially upon the sexes: initially their influence was greatest upon the males, but by 1977 girl students had "caught up" and were about as likely as their male peers to spend evening time away from home.

Sources of spending money. It was anticipated from the modernization/family attenuation proposition that students in 1977 would be less dependent upon their families for spending money than students were in 1924. The findings did not support this position. Comparisons of the percentage distributions in Table 2 reveal that males in 1977 were significantly *more* likely to report income from family (either from fixed allowances or asking parents), with 18 percent reporting such familial sources in 1924, compared to 32 percent in 1977. A slightly higher percentage of males in 1977 said they received money from jobs, while in 1924 a much higher proportion of males reported income from several sources, including money from family. The findings are somewhat ambiguous—male students in 1977 were more likely to earn money, and also more likely to receive allowances—but the findings do not support the view that 1977 males were less dependent upon their families for spending money than the

Table 2. Student Reports[a] of Sources of Spending Money, 1924 and 1977

	Males		*Females*	
	1924	*1977*	*1924*	*1977*
Fixed allowance	3% *	14%	11%	12%
Asking your parents for money as you need it, or gifts from other sources	15	18	53 *	20
Earning money	37 *	45	9 *	40
No main source, or combination of the above	45 *	22	27	28
Number of cases (*N*)	(386)	(479)	(454)	(516)

[a] In the 1924 survey the item read, "Check the one or ones of the following ways in which you get your spending money," followed by four categories: "fixed allowance," "asking your parents for money as you need it," "earning money," and "gifts from other sources than parents." However, the Lynds' (1929:142) published distribution of responses combined "asking your parents . . ." and "gifts from other sources" in a single category. In the 1977 survey the item was worded, "How do you get most of your spending money? (Please circle the *main* source of most of your spending money") followed by these categories: "fixed allowance," "asking my parents for money as I need it," "earning money (job)," "gifts from other sources than parents," and "no main source, or combination of the above."

* Percentage differences between adjoining columns statistically significant at the .01 level.

1924 males. The 1924–77 comparisons for female students reveal that the 1977 females were much less likely to receive money from their families, and more than four times as likely to be earning their own spending money. Thus, as with the question about evenings at home, the comparisons reveal a situation where male students in 1977 are comparable to the male students in 1924, but the two sets of female students differ markedly, with the difference in the predicted direction.

A comparison of sex differences in 1924 and 1977 reveals changes similar to those affecting evenings at home. In 1924 the females were strikingly different from the males in being much more likely to receive their spending money from parents in the form of fixed allowances or on a demand basis, a situation that the Lynds characterized (1929:142) as follows: "While over three-fourths of these Middletown boys are thus learning habits of independence as regards money matters by earning and managing at least part of their money, over half of the girls are busily acquiring the habits of money dependence that characterize Middletown wives by being entirely dependent upon their parents for their spending money without even a regular allowance." By 1977 that differential so deplored by the Lynds had disappeared. As may be seen by comparing columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, in 1977 there was no difference in sources of spending money between high school boys and girls in Middletown.

FAMILY AND SEX EDUCATION

The percentages in Table 3 support the notion that the role of the family in the transmission of sexual knowledge to young people has declined over the past 50 years. In 1924, one-third of the males and two-thirds of the females said their major source of sex information was parents. By 1977, each of these percentages had declined by about half so that only one-fifth of the males and about one-third of

Table 3. Student Reports[a] of Sources of Sex Information, by Sex, 1924 and 1977

	Males		*Females*	
Sources of Knowledge on Sex	*1924*	*1977*	*1924*	*1977*
Mother or father	32% *	18%	68% *	35%
Friends	42	38	22 *	35
Schoolteachers	4	5	4	9
Books or films[b]	—	14	—	9
Television[b]	—	1	—	0
Church teachers or ministers	1	0	2	0
YMCA or YWCA	11 *	0	1	0
Other	10[c] *	24	3[c] *	13
Own experience, myself, on my own		10		3
Brothers or sisters		1		2
From the streets		2		0
Combination of above categories		8		7
Other		3		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%
Number of cases (*N*)	(264)	(484)	(344)	(514)

[a] In the Lynds' questionnaire the item was worded, "Check the one of the following sources from which you have received most of whatever knowledge you have on sex matters" followed by the response categories "From boy or girl friends," "from school teachers," "from mother or father," "from Sunday School teachers," "from Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A.," and "from other sources (state what)." However, in writing about the item in *Middletown* the Lynds stated it differently: "From what source did you receive most of whatever information you have on sex matters?" (Lynd and Lynd, 1929:146). In the 1977 replication the wording paralleled that on the 1924 questionnaire rather than the version in the book. It read: "Which *one* of the following sources has provided you with most of whatever knowledge you have on sex matters?" followed by these categories: mother or father, school teachers, church teachers or ministers, friends, books or films, television, YMCA or YWCA, and other (please explain)."

[b] Not given as a possible response in 1924. However, the Lynds (1929:146) noted: "Movies and the so-called 'sex magazines' were not mentioned specifically by any of the children, but according to many parents . . . these play an important part." This comment prompted us to include these two categories as specific options in the 1977 instrument.

[c] Not given by the Lynds (1929:146); we arrived at these figures by subtracting the sum of the percentages they listed for specific categories from 100 percent. Their only comment about the composition of students in this residual category was: "Other answers were scattered."

* Percentage differences between adjoining columns statistically significant at the .01 level.

the females identified parents as the primary source of sex knowledge.

Friends were the most important source of sex knowledge for male students in 1924, and remained so in 1977. The importance of YMCA workers as a source of sex education had dwindled from 11 percent in 1924 to nothing in 1977, and books or films had replaced them as third most frequent source. The greatest change occurs among the female students, for whom parents were the main source of sex information in 1924. By 1977 friends had become as important a source as parents (both 35 percent), followed by schoolteachers and books or films (both 9 percent).

The figures in Table 3 also accord with the previously noted pattern of increasing similarity between female students and their male counterparts. By 1977 the proportion of females identifying friends as the primary source of sex knowledge was almost the same as for males, and in the other categories their distribution was much closer to that for males than it was in 1924.

One of the striking changes is the relative importance of the "other" category in 1977, and so a breakdown of the major types of responses making up this category was included in the table. Most of the males represented in this category listed a variation of "myself" or "my own experience," or else stated two or more sources; most females categorized here also listed two or more sources, apparently finding it difficult to distinguish a single major source of knowledge about sex. The analysis of the nature of the "other" responses produced no evidence that we were overlooking a substantial parental influence imbedded in the multiple responses listed there. On the contrary, the detailed analysis of this residual category reaffirmed the finding that in 1977 parents were fairly unimportant sources of sex information for males, and no more important than friends as sources of sex knowledge for female students.

STUDENT PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTS

Sources of disagreement with parents. The Lynds used a list of 13 possible topics to assess the nature of students' disagreements with their parents. The students were encouraged to mark as many of the items on the list as fit their situation. There was no attempt to measure intensity of conflict, only the topics of disagreement. However, comparisons of the incidence of disagreements of a given type may provide some clues about changes in the extent of parent-student conflict over the 53-year period. The relevant percentage distributions are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Student Reports[a] of Sources of Disagreement with Their Parents, by Sex, 1924 and 1977

	Males			*Females*		
	1924		*1977*	*1924*		*1977*
The hours [1924: hour] you get in at night	45%		46%	43%		42%
The number of times you go out on school nights during the week	45	**	31	48	**	35
Your grades at school [1924: Grades at school]	40		34	31		28
Your spending money	37		38	29		29
Use of the automobile	36	*	29	30	*	22
The people [1924: boys or girls] you choose as friends	25	*	33	27	*	36
Home duties (yardwork, cooking, helping around the house, etc.) [1924: . . . (tending furnace, cooking etc.)]	19	**	45	26	**	46
Church and attendance at religious services [1924: . . . and Sunday School attendance]	19	*	11	19		13
The way you dress (including hair style, general grooming) [1924: The way you dress]	16	**	25	25		19
Going to unchaperoned parties	15	**	27	28		29
Sunday (or Sabbath) observance, aside from attendance at services [1924: Sunday observance, aside from just going to Church and Sunday School]	14	*	6	14	**	3
Clubs or societies you belong to	6		6	10		5
Other causes of disagreement (please explain) [1924: State any other causes of disagreement]	10		16	8	**	28
Number of cases (N)	(348)		(442)	(382)		(488)

[a] The items in the two surveys were practically identical. The 1924 item was (Lynd and Lynd, 1929:522): "Check the things listed below about which you and your parents disagree." [Items listed in table followed, and then this probe:] "State any other causes of disagreement." The same item in the 1977 questionnaire read: "Circle below the things about which you and your parents disagree. You may circle more than one; circle as many as you feel you have disagreements about." The wording of the categories in the above table corresponds to the 1977 version, with differences between it and the 1924 version noted parenthetically.

* Differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

** Differences are statistically significant at the .01 level.

In 1924 the most frequent sources of disagreement with parents, reported by over 40 percent of both male and female students, were the hours they got in at night and the number of times during the week they went out. In 1977 the hour the student came home nights was also the most important source of disagreement for males (and the

second most important for females), and the proportion of students reporting disagreements with parents on this topic was about the same as 50 years earlier. Less important in 1977 as a precipitant of disagreements was the number of times during the week the student wanted to go out (mentioned by almost half of the students in 1924 but only about one-third in 1977). Also slightly less important in 1977 as sources of disagreement were the use of the automobile, persons chosen as friends, church attendance, and Sunday (or Sabbath) observance.

For males there were three topics which were much more a source of disagreement for the 1977 students than for the students in their grandfather's generation: conflict over home duties, conflict over dress and grooming, and conflict over attending unchaperoned parties. Friendship choices and home duties were also more frequently mentioned as sources of disagreement by female students in 1977. On balance, the percentages in Table 4 do not suggest that the incidence of parent-youth conflict in Middletown families was greater in 1977 than in 1924. In fact, in both periods those topics about which the highest levels of disagreement occurred generated about the same proportion of reported disagreement, in the 45–46 percent range.

In 1977 there was much more family conflict over helping around the house or doing yardwork than there had formerly been, for among both male and female students the largest percentage change occurred with respect to this item. On the other hand, there was less disagreement in 1977 over children's use of the family automobile, evenings away from home, and church-related issues. It is also noteworthy that the frequencies of reported disagreement about grades, spending money, student organizations, and hours for getting home at night were the same in 1977 as in 1924.

The figures in Table 4 also reveal the trend toward greater similarity between male and female students that has been noted earlier. In 1924 going to unchaperoned parties was a greater source of conflict for females than males; in 1977 the reported rates are the same. Compared to the males, female students in 1924 were more apt to report disagreements about home duties and less apt to report disagreement about school grades; in 1977 the male-female differences for both these sources of disagreement had decreased.

These findings do not support the notion that the generation gap was wider in 1977 than in 1924. There is some evidence of change in topics of disagreement, but the overall levels of disagreement are comparable and on many items the 1977 rates are remarkably like the 1924 rates.

Desirable parental characteristics. Student views about desirable

characteristics in parents were elicited in responses to two questions, one referring to mothers and the other to fathers. In each, 10 characteristics were listed and respondents were asked to identify "the two qualities below that you consider most desirable." The characteristics for fathers included "being a college graduate," "spending time with his children . . .," "making plenty of money," "being an active church member," "owning a good-looking car," "being prominent in social life," "never nagging his children about what they do," "being well dressed," "having a love of music and poetry," and "respecting his children's opinions." Those listed for mothers were largely the same, except that "being a good cook and housekeeper" was substituted for "making plenty of money," and "being a good hostess" was substituted for "owning a good-looking car." There were also slight differences between the fathers' and mothers' versions of the "spending time with children" and "never nagging" questions.

If there has been an attrition of certain family functions, we might expect the characteristics of "good" parents in 1977 to differ from those in 1924. The student responses about "most desirable" characteristics of parents, summarized in Table 5, do reveal some sharp differences. But perhaps most notable is the 50-year consensus about the quality most desired in fathers. About two-thirds of the Middletown students of 1924 selected "spending time with his children" as one of the two most desired qualities of fathers, and no other quality had anywhere near that degree of consensus. In 1977, roughly the same proportion again selected "spending time with his children" as a most desirable paternal characteristic. In other words, what the students say they want from fathers is, more than anything else, for fathers to spend time with them.

Although the proportion of students saying that they think fathers should spend time with their children shows no change, the three characteristics selected next most frequently do change between 1924 and 1977. In 1924, 34 percent of the males and 42 percent of the females selected "respecting his children's opinions" as the next most important paternal characteristic. Although it was the second most frequently cited trait, it lagged far behind "spending time with his children" in frequency of mention. However, by 1977 it had increased in perceived importance to the point that for both males and females it was on a par with "spending time." The 1977 students clearly identified these two qualities of fathers as the most important ones in the list. No other trait commanded support by more than one-sixth of the students.

The two paternal characteristics selected by the next highest num-

Table 5. Percent of Students Identifying Selected Qualities[a] As One of the Two "Most Desirable" Qualities of Mothers and Fathers, by Sex, 1924 and 1977

	Males			*Females*		
	1924		*1977*	*1924*		*1977*
Qualities most desirable in a father						
Spending time with his children, reading, talking, playing, etc.[b]	62%		64%	67%		71%
Respecting his children's opinions	34	*	62	42	*	76
Being an active church member	27	*	7	30	*	7
Being a college graduate	23	*	4	13	*	4
Never nagging his children about what they do	12		13	12		12
Making plenty of money	12		17	11		10
Being well-dressed	6		6	5		4
Being prominent in social life	5		8	2	*	7
Having a love of music and poetry	4		1	6	*	2
Owning a good-looking car	3		5	2		2
Number of Cases (*N*)	(369)		(472)	(415)		(506)
Qualities most desirable in a mother						
Being a good cook and housekeeper	57	*	41	52	*	24
Spending time with her children, reading, talking, playing, etc.[c]	34	*	58	41	*	66
Being an active church member	25	*	8	25	*	9
Respecting her children's opinions	24	*	57	22	*	72
Never nagging her children about what they did	23	*	14	34	*	13
Being a college graduate	7	*	2	4		2
Being well-dressed	8		6	3		6
Having a love of music and poetry	6		2	3		1
Being a good hostess	4		2	4		2
Being prominent in social life	4	*	9	4		7
Number of cases (*N*)	(369)		(462)	(423)		(506)

[a] For each parent the question in 1977 read, "Please circle the *two* qualities in the list below that you consider most desirable in a mother" (or father). Inspection of the Lynds' questionnaire revealed that in 1924 they asked about the *four* most desirable qualities, but their published findings (1929:524) refer only to the first two qualities noted. Their item read: "Place a capital letter A before the 2 qualities below that you consider most desirable in a father [or, in the other item, mother] and a capital letter B before the 2 qualitites that you consider next most desirable."

[b] The 1924 question read, ". . . playing with them, etc."

[c] The 1924 question read, "Always having time to read, talk, go on picnics or play with her children."

[d] The 1924 question read, "Never losing her temper or nagging."

* Percentage differences between adjoining columns statistically significant at the .01 level.

bers of students in 1924 were "being an active church member" and "being a college graduate." In 1924 about one-fourth of the males selected each of these, and almost one-third of the girls listed "being an active church member" as highly desirable. The 1977 respondents did not consider either of them to be important. Thus the char-

acteristics of the "model father," which in 1924 included spending time with his children, respecting their opinions, being an active church member, and (for male students at least) being a college graduate, had by 1977 shrunk to only two, spending time with children and respecting their opinions.

Student evaluation of qualities most desirable in mothers showed considerable change over the 53-year period, and several aspects of the maternal role have declined in importance. In 1977 students were less likely to rate cooking and housekeeping skills, active church participation, and "never nagging" as important qualities in a mother. Whereas in 1924 both males and females had rated being a good cook and housekeeper as the single most important quality for mothers, by 1977 this characteristic had dropped to third position. Much more important in 1977, particularly in the ratings by female students, were spending time with children and respecting the children's opinions, the same two qualities that had been ranked as most desirable in fathers. In other words, the parental traits deemed most desirable by Middletown students in 1977 were the same for both mothers and fathers.

There were few sex differences in perceptions of qualities desired in parents. The ratings by male and female students in 1924 were roughly parallel, and so were those in 1977 with the exception of two characteristics of mothers. Female students in 1977 were only about half as likely as males to rate a mother's cooking and housekeeping skills as important (24 percent, compared to 41 percent), and more of the females listed respect by a mother for her children's opinions as highly desirable.

Finally, there is much more consensus about desirable parental qualities among the 1977 respondents than there was in 1924, and the consensus is highest among females, almost three-fourths of whom rate respecting their children's opinions as the most desirable quality of mothers and fathers. These findings must be interpreted cautiously because we are limited to the 10 qualities of the Lynds' list, but it seems that the range of desirable parental characteristics has narrowed somewhat and is much more focused on direct parent-child relationships of an emotional or expressive nature than on the parents' participation or status in nonfamily institutions.

Summary and Discussion

The interpretation of changes in Middletown's family values and behavior is complicated, for Middletown has changed since 1924 in demographic and institutional character. Some of the demographic

changes can be illustrated with census data. The Lynds do not report figures for median educational attainment for the city in 1920, but contrasts between 1940 and 1970 are sufficient to make the point: today's residents are far better educated than their parents or grandparents were. In 1940 the median years of school completed for adults 25 and over in Middletown were 8.7 for males and 9.0 for females; by 1970 the corresponding figures were 11.8 and 11.6. More directly relevant to a high school survey, young people in Middletown of 1977 were far more likely to attend school than their 1920 counterparts. According to the census reports, in 1920, 76 percent of the city's 14- to 15-year-olds were enrolled in school, compared to 99 percent in 1970, and among the 16- to 17-year-olds in 1920 only 30 percent were in school, compared to 77 percent in 1970. Thus, the high school juniors and seniors represented in the Lynds' data were statistically an elite, whereas in 1977 the great majority of young people under age 18 were still in school.

Statistics on employment also illustrate Middletown's changing composition. Compared to the situation in 1970, employed adults of 1920 were far more likely to work in manufacturing (64 percent, compared to 46 percent), less likely to be directly employed by the government (less than 2 percent were in the category "public service" in 1920, compared to 13 percent in 1970), and less likely to be in professional occupations (6 percent, as opposed to 12 percent in 1970). The student reports about family life undoubtedly reflect the compositional as well as the generational changes which have occurred.

We have compared student reports about the number of evenings they spend at home, the sources of their spending money and of their knowledge about sex, their perceptions of topics about which they and their parents disagree, and the qualities they define as most desirable in mothers and fathers. The 1977 students differ from those of 1924 in that: (1) females spend more evening time away from home; (2) males (but not females) are more likely to have fixed allowances, and students of both sexes are more likely to earn their own money; (3) they are much less likely to receive their sex information from their parents, and, for females, friends play a much greater role in the transmission of sex knowledge; (4) helping with household tasks, which was not a major source of family conflict in 1924, has become a major source of family disagreement; (5) respect for homemaking skills as a desirable characteristic of mothers has declined; and (6) the importance of parental respect for children's opinions has increased markedly.

If it could be shown that substantial class differences exist today in

the items we have discussed, it might plausibly be argued that changes in Middletown's class composition have produced these intergenerational shifts in student responses. Inasmuch as the Lynds did not publish breakdowns of these items by social class, a direct test of this notion is not possible. However, it is possible to compare modern students' responses with respect to the working class–business class differences in fathers' occupation, which the Lynds argued was so central to life in Middletown. Accordingly, for each of the five major variables considered in this paper, class and sex controls were added for the entire (freshmen through seniors) 1977 sample of Middletown high school students.

No significant differences by class emerged for sources of sex information. Within the same-sex groupings, there was never more than a 6 percent difference between young people from working class and business class (i.e., blue-collar and white-collar) families. For number of evenings spent at home, there was a significant difference for males but not females: males from blue-collar families were more likely than white-collar males to be away from home every night (26 percent versus 16 percent, respectively). The only social class difference in sources of spending money was that working class children were more likely to say that they asked their parents for money as needed.

In qualities judged desirable in a father, there were no social class differences; in qualities judged desirable in a mother, blue-collar children, both males and females, were significantly more likely to select "good homemaker" as a desirable maternal quality (for males, 42 percent versus 34 percent, and for females 29 percent versus 17 percent), and the white-collar females were significantly more likely than the other females to select "respecting her children's opinions" as a desirable quality (77 percent versus 68 percent, respectively). There were several class differences in topics of disagreements with parents, including significant differentials for both males and females with respect to "the people you choose as friends" and "your grades at school." In both cases, young people from blue-collar families reported the highest rates of conflict. Home duties were cited as a significant source of conflict more frequently by blue-collar females than by white-collar females.

The minor class differentials in evenings away from home, sources of spending money, and sources of sex information are too small to support the argument that the 1925–77 changes are primarily a consequence of changing class composition. If white-collar children were more likely than blue-collar children to report conflict with parents

over household tasks, that would be evidence for the greater "middle-classification" of Middletown as an explanation for the increased rate of family conflict over household tasks, but the present class differential runs the other way. Thus, only for the item on qualities desirable in a mother are the existing class differences such that an increase in the relative size of the business class (white-collar) population could be expected to have produced the kinds of change which the 50-year comparisons reveal. In other words, if we may generalize backward from present social class differences, it appears that most of the changes in family characteristics we have identified are not attributable to changes in the social class composition of Middletown.

Do these changes support the Lynds' notion about the declining centrality of the family and the growing gap between parents and their children? Many of these findings may be interpreted as evidence for a continued attrition of family function. Such attrition may be inferred from the greater student consensus about parents' spending time with and respecting their children's opinions as the most desired parental qualities. It is directly evident in the decline in student support for homemaking skills as an essential characteristic of mothers, the decline in the role of parents in the sex education of their children, the increased tendency of female students to spend evenings away from home and to get their spending money from employment, and in the heightened student resistance to doing household tasks, as indicated by the increase in parent-child disagreement over this topic.

Although there is evidence for some continued decline in the centrality of the family, particularly in the lives of the female students, there is no evidence in these data that the generation gap in 1977 is any wider than it was in 1924. Indeed, the much higher value placed on parental respect for children's opinions and the continued affirmation that parents should spend time with their children suggest that the expressive/emotional function of the family is more important for Middletown students of 1977 than it was in 1924.

Most of the comparisons discussed above support the linkage between modernization and the attrition of certain family functions described by the Lynds. There are some inconsistencies, and several instances where the patterns described in 1924 still seem to apply. But where change has occurred, it has generally been in the anticipated direction. The continued impact of modernization upon the family ties of Middletown's young people is most apparent upon young women, such that many of the male-female differences apparent in 1924 have now disappeared. Finally, although certain family functions seem to

have declined in importance, there is no evidence that there is greater alienation between parents and youth in 1977 than in 1924. In fact, greater emphasis upon time together and mutual respect may have increased some types of family solidarity.

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Time of Decision and Media Use During the Ford-Carter Campaign

STEVEN H. CHAFFEE AND SUN YUEL CHOE

FALL PRESIDENTIAL election campaigns have for three decades been thought to have little impact on the vote, owing to a paradoxical relationship between media use and the time at which the voter makes his final decision. Since the pioneering work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and their colleagues (1944; 1954), the electorate has been pictured in terms of a dichotomous model: citizens fall into either of two possible categories, each of which is impervious to political mass communication for a quite different reason. On the one hand, there is a large group of precommitted voters. As Pool (1963) has described them, the precommitted are partisans who "are inclined to read about politics or to listen to political speeches" but who "already have strong views which are not going to be changed in the eight weeks of an election campaign." And then there are the rest of the voters, who make up their minds seemingly at the last minute. They are less opinionated

Abstract This paper challenges the traditional belief that a full presidential political campaign can have only "limited effects" on voting, by identifying a group of voters who make their decisions during the campaign rather than either prior to or very late in the campaign. In a panel study of Wisconsin voters in the 1976 election, 40 percent were Campaign Deciders. These voters were low in partisanship, but paid close attention to the campaign and the Ford-Carter debates, and voted in accordance with campaign-specific perceptions. By contrast, both Pre-campaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders voted mainly on the basis of party identification.

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and correlatively more persuasible than the early deciders, but they are also less interested and consequently pay little attention to political news. They are unaffected by the media not because of resistance, but simply because of lack of exposure (Berelson and Steiner, 1964).

There are numerous recent examples of this dichotomous analysis. For instance, Buchanan (1977) summarizes prior research as demonstrating "that relatively few people changed their opinions during a campaign and that those who did were more likely to have been influenced by primary group pressures than by the issue appeals of the candidates; . . . and that 'independent' or shifting voters were not issue-oriented in their outlook." Katz (1973) paints a similar picture: "Typically about 80 percent, or more, of the voters have made up their minds about the vote before the campaign begins, that is at least several months prior to the election. . . . The changers—those who shift from one party to another *during* the campaign—have been found to be relatively uninterested in the election and its outcome . . . [and] are not much exposed to mass communications about politics" (emphasis his). McCombs (1972) agrees: "Those who make their vote decisions . . . before the fall campaign gets underway . . . make greater use of the media than the voter who enters the campaign period uncommitted or undecided." In all of these instances, the studies of elections in the 1940s are cited as the source of empirical support for the conclusion.

Theoretical Issues

The "limited effects" or "minimal consequences" assumption that has been derived from these dichotomous contrasts can be broken down into the following causal propositions:

1. Partisan precommitment is sufficient to preclude campaign effects.
2. Partisan precommitment is necessary to produce interest in the election.
3. Interest in the election is necessary to produce exposure to the campaign.
4. Exposure to the campaign is necessary for media effects.

The first of these statements is adequate to predict limited (at most) effects for those who identify strongly with a party and who consequently decide how they will vote before the campaign begins. (While statement 1 is an obvious oversimplification, we will not digress into its merits here.) The remaining three statements comprise a chain of requirements that in the dichotomous model have been used to predict limited effects for the entire remainder of the voters—who are all

presumed to lack interest because they lack partisanship (statement 2). But while statement 4 is true almost by definition, there is no clear theoretical reasoning behind statements 2 and 3. They are based upon empirical correlations that were apparently strong in the 1940s, but they are dubious as causal propositions. Given the many changes in politics and mass communication in the intervening 30 years, there is reason to consider more current evidence and the possibility of theoretical revision.

Regarding statement 2, partisanship has been steadily declining since the 1950s, both in absolute terms and in the power of party identification to predict voting behavior (Nie, et al., 1976). But the lack of corresponding evidence of a decline in political interest suggests that the two variables are not closely related in a functional sense and that the empirical correlation between them may have diminished.[1] Regarding statement 3, the emergence of television as the principal vehicle for political campaigning (Barber, 1978) has probably reduced the amount of motivation required for a person to become exposed to campaign messages. While in the 1940s it probably did require some specific effort to follow the campaign in the newspapers of Erie County (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and Elmira (Berelson et al., 1954), today's voter would have to go to some lengths to *avoid* exposure to the many political advertisements and newscasts that are broadcast. Such modern campaign events as televised debates are witnessed by some 80 to 90 percent of the electorate (Katz and Feldman, 1962; Sears and Chaffee, 1979). For statement 3 to remain valid in the face of this ubiquitous campaign exposure, political interest would have had to become much more widespread than was the case in the pretelevision era. While interest may be *sufficient* to stimulate added exposure, it is likely that incidental exposure also stimulates interest in the campaign. There does not seem to be a unidirectional causal process at work; recent historical evidence suggests that campaign interest and television attention have risen together (Nie et al., 1976:2).

A weakening of the presumed linkages from partisanship to campaign interest via exposure (statements 2 and 3) would imply that there has emerged a sizable voting group that is indeed interested and attentive to political content in the media, but not so partisan and precommitted as to be unaffected by the campaign and its coverage. As Katz (1973) suggests, "The combination of a low degree of [party] loyalty and yet some exposure to election communication has become

[1] There seems to have been a slight tendency toward lower voter turnout in recent years. The apparent decline in party identification has, however, been much more striking statistically.

a more probable combination in the era of television than ever before." The decision-making processes of such a voter would be of particular interest to students of mass communication; the amount and quality of campaign coverage by the media would be much more important factors if there are significant numbers of voters who defer their decisions until they have a chance to compare the candidates during the final months of intense campaigning.

Research Hypotheses

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of voter decision making that involves complex relationships among partisanship, mass media use, and cognitions about candidates derived from an election campaign. Our central assumption is that vote decisions can be made on the basis of either preexisting partisan commitments *or* exposure to the campaign (or both). Empirically these two classes of voting decisions should be differentially associated with precampaign and campaign-specific cognitions, communication, and predictor variables.

Time of decision would be dependent on the class of information the voter relies upon. Precampaign decisions must be based on precampaign cognitions, such as party identification and its socioeconomic and ideological correlates. Those who lack strong precampaign decision cues must rely more on campaign-specific cognitions about the candidates and their policy positions; they should be more likely to decide *during* the campaign period when information of this type is most available. Those who lack both kinds of information—i.e., whose party identification is weak, and who lack campaign-specific information because of nonexposure—should be the most likely to remain undecided until the last days of the campaign.

The fall 1976 contest between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter was rich in candidate-specific information, largely because of the series of televised debates that juxtaposed the two contenders in a comparative and issue-oriented format (Chaffee, 1978; Sears and Chaffee, 1979). Given this easily accessible information, an attentive voter could have formed a fairly clear picture of the differences between the candidates after a few weeks. Many undecided voters entered the campaign period with "tentative" decisions or feelings of "leaning" toward one candidate. With heavy information flow, these decisions could be crystallized without waiting until the last minute. The Ford-Carter campaign, then, was one in which we should find a substantial group of voters who do not fit the traditional description of either group in the dichotomous model of prior electoral research.

We will call this third group Campaign Deciders and distinguish them from the other groups, which we will characterize here as Precampaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders.

We postulate that precampaign cognitions and campaign information flow are two independent variables that lead to voting decisions made at different times. For purposes of data analysis, we will use time of decision as a sorting variable, comparing the three groups of voters for evidence of differential information-holding, communication, and decision-making processes. Strong precampaign decision cues should differentiate Precampaign Deciders from those who are undecided at the start of the campaign, and strong within-campaign decision cues should differentiate Campaign Deciders from those who remain undecided near the end of the campaign. This pattern should manifest itself in terms of both the strength of political cognitions and communication activity, and the degree to which the person's vote is predicted by precampaign vs. campaign-specific cognitions.

As in prior studies, we expect that the Precampaign Deciders will be higher than other voters in socioeconomic status. More important, we hypothesize specifically that they will exhibit greater campaign communications (mass and interpersonal) and perceived differentiation between the candidates *prior to the fall campaign*. Decisions made by the Campaign Deciders should be associated with increased communication activity, especially attention to the highly accessible information about the candidates provided by television, and with strengthened perceptions of differences between the candidates *during the campaign*.

In directional analyses of vote decisions, we hypothesize qualitative differences in the determinants of Precampaign and Campaign Deciders' choices. Decisions made prior to the campaign should be most strongly predicted by precampaign cognitions such as party identification. Within-campaign decisions, however, should be more strongly predicted by campaign-specific cognitions, such as perceived differences between the candidates in this particular election.

These hypotheses leave us with little to say about the voting decisions of the Last-minute Deciders. We expect them to be lacking in all varieties of decision cues that we have mentioned, both precampaign and campaign-specific. Consequently we should expect to account for less of the variation in their votes by the variables we have discussed here, such as party identification and differentiation between the candidates. Some writers have asserted that Last-Minute Deciders are influenced mainly by interpersonal communication rather than by the media (Berelson et al., 1954; Pool, 1963). There is no systematic data analysis to support this conclusion in the main

source cited, however (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). While we will not attempt to examine interpersonal *influence* here, our other hypotheses (above) include the prediction that the Last-minute Deciders will be the group *lowest* in interpersonal discussion both prior to and during the campaign. Prior research has shown a close association between frequency of interpersonal discussion of a topic and attention to it in the mass media (Chaffee, 1972), and most interpersonal influence attempts are directed at people who are in turn making similar influence attempts themselves (Troldahl and Van Dam, 1965; O'Keefe, 1975). In a recent study of young voters in a British election, Blumler and McLeod (1974) found that those who remained undecided late in the campaign were less interested, less attentive to the media, *and* less likely to discuss the election with their families.

Overall, then, we expect to replicate prior research that has distinguished between Precampaign and Last-minute Deciders, but to point up the possibility of significant campaign effects on a third group, who come to their decisions during the campaign period. We do not expect the Campaign Deciders to be simply waiting, but rather to be waiting for information that will come to them via the news media as the campaign progresses. We expect them to increase their communication activity to get that information, and then to use it in making their voting decisions. By contrast, we do expect the Last-minute Deciders to be uninvolved voters who have simply waited, without paying much attention to the campaign, and consequently not to make their decisions on the basis of campaign-specific information.

Design and Measurement

Our data collection design was a four-wave panel survey of a statewide random sample of Wisconsin citizens during the fall of 1976 (see Dennis and Chaffee, 1978). The first wave of interviews was conducted in the week prior to the first Ford-Carter debate (held September 23), and the second wave in the week following that debate. Wave 3 occurred following the final debate (October 23 through November 1), and the final wave following the November 2 election. All interviews were conducted by telephone, and sampling was based on a probability sample of area codes and telephone prefixes, followed by four random digits. Three callbacks were tried before a number was abandoned. Within households, adults were selected randomly according to a predetermined schedule. The panel consisted of $N = 164$ persons who were interviewed in each of the four waves. Of those who reported their votes in the postelection

interview, 49.6 percent said they had voted for Carter, and 48.9 percent for Ford; these figures are quite close to the actual Wisconsin vote, of which Carter received 49.4 percent and Ford 47.8 percent.

In measuring time of final decision, we assumed that the period of heaviest campaign information flow occurred between the first and third waves of interviewing. All of the televised debates, which were the most prominent public communication events of the campaign, took place in this time period. Working back in time from the person's reported vote (Time 4), each voter was classified according to the earliest time at which he or she expressed a definite and lasting intention to vote that way.[2] Those who voted but had still not been certain of their intention even at Time 3 are the Last-minute Deciders. Those who had definitely decided by the time of the first interview, and who never expressed uncertainty in subsequent interviews, are the Precampaign Deciders. The remainder, who first said they had definitely made their voting decisions in either the Time 2 or Time 3 interview, are grouped for our analysis as Campaign Deciders.

The wording of various interview questions was standardized so that responses from one wave to another would be comparable. In each wave, we measured attention to campaign content via television, and via newspapers and magazines; discussion about the campaign; perceptions of candidates' personal qualities and abilities, or image; their own positions, and those they perceived the candidates as holding, on several issues; their party identification; and political ideology (liberal-conservative). Five-point response scales were used for all issue, image, and ideology questions. Several standard demographic measures were included, mostly in Wave 1. In Waves 2 and 3, additional questions were asked about the extent to which the debate(s) immediately preceding that interview had been watched and discussed.

Image measures consisted of the rating assigned to Ford or Carter on each of the following attributes: honesty and integrity, strength and decisiveness, capacity for effective leadership of the government, making clear his position on the issues, and ability to inspire confidence by the way he speaks. These five items were highly intercorrelated, forming a single factor; a sixth scale, friendly and pleasant, was dropped after factor analysis indicated it did not load strongly with

[2] Voters were classified as not yet finally decided even if they had a preference but declined in response to a probe to say they were "certain" of their intentions, or "definitely" would vote that way. We found many cases who considered themselves definite/certain at Time 1, but who were less sure in a later interview; these are classified by the final expression of definite/certain vote intention, not the first.

the other five. In the case of issues, one of the four that were included in the questionnaire was dropped after item analyses showed it to have extremely weak discriminating power. The deleted issue item dealt with abortion; the three that were retained for summary analyses had to do with government efforts to alleviate unemployment, reform of the tax system, and defense expenditures (see Dennis et al., 1979).

Two distinct kinds of indices were constructed from the five image and three issue items. One set of indices provides estimates of the degree to which the respondent saw differences between the candidates; these are called *candidate discrimination* measures. Image Discrimination was calculated by subtracting the rating of Ford on each measure from that of Carter, and summing these absolute differences. Issue Discrimination consisted of the absolute difference between the positions the respondent perceived Ford and Carter as holding on each of the three issues, and summing these differences. The image and issue discrimination indices were highly intercorrelated ($r = .61$ in the total sample), which is to say that those who saw large differences between the candidates as individuals also tended to perceive large policy differences.

The second set of indices based on the image and issue items were directional measures of *candidate evaluations*. For the image items, it was assumed that all of the attributes (honesty, strength, leadership, etc.) were positive evaluations; separate indices of favorable ratings of Ford and of Carter were first calculated, and then Ford's were subtracted from Carter's to create a net evaluation scale. Favorable ratings on the issue items were assumed to be relative to the respondent's own positions. For each issue, the Ford-self and Carter-self distances were calculated, and then the latter was subtracted from the former to create a net score; these net distances were summed across the three issues. These directional net evaluation measures, all signed in the same (pro-Carter) direction, were used as predictors of the vote in data analysis.

Party identification was measured by a conventional series of branching questions that produced a 7-point scale ranging from "strong Democrat" to "weak" or "leaning" or "independent" categories, and on to "strong Republican." A 4-point measure of partisanship was created by folding over the party identification scale so that "strong" adherents of either party were grouped together, as were "weak" identifiers, etc. A 5-point liberal-conservative scale was similarly folded over, to create a 3-point measure of strength of ideology.

Analyses and Results

Approximately 40 percent of the voters in our panel were classified as Campaign Deciders, and the remainder were almost equally divided between Precampaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders. Different operational criteria, and a different election campaign, might have yielded fewer Campaign Deciders, but it is clear that they are a substantial group in this instance at least.

A preliminary overview of the distinctiveness of the Campaign Deciders is provided in Table 1. Here a number of precampaign and within-campaign measures are presented; all means have been converted to standard scores to facilitate comparisons between rows. No statistical tests are reported in Table 1, since we have not hypothesized univariate differences among the three groups. Before we turn to tests of our hypotheses about decided vs. undecided voters at various stages of the campaign, however, Table 1 is worth some consideration. The data are in line with most of our assumptions

Table 1. Precampaign and Within-Campaign Comparisons (Standard Scores), by Time of Decision

	Precampaign Deciders	*Campaign Deciders*	*Last-minute Deciders*
Precampaign measures (Time 1)			
Ideological strength	+15	−17	+09
Partisanship strength	+22	−13	−05
Education	+20	−04	−15
Income	+14	+10	−27
Television precampaign attention	+16	−04	−04
Newspaper/magazine precampaign attention	+19	−02	−16
Discussion of campaign	+36	−04	−30
Issue discrimination	+22	−02	−18
Image discrimination	+54	−19	−28
Within-campaign measures (Time 2 and 3)			
Television campaign attention	−03	+29	−35
Newspaper/magazine campaign attention	+11	+18	−34
Discussion of campaign	+24	+06	−32
Viewing of debates	−13	+18	−34
Discussion of debates	+10	+08	−20
Issue discrimination (Time 3)	+31	−05	−23
Image discrimination (Time 3)	+42	+05	−47
	(*N* = 41)	(*N* = 56)	(*N* = 42)

NOTE: For each row in this table, raw data were converted to standard scores by subtracting the mean for the total sample from each group mean, and dividing this deviation score by the overall standard deviation. Scores have been multiplied by 100 for simplicity.

about the nature of the three groups. Perhaps the most noteworthy finding is the stepped-up communication activity of the Campaign Deciders during the campaign period. The expected Time 1 differences between the Precampaign Deciders and the Last-minute Deciders, in terms of partisanship, socioeconomic status, communication, and candidate discrimination, are quite marked. These differences do not change much in magnitude during the campaign, but for campaign-related measures the standard scores at Time 3 are altered (while remaining about as far apart as before) because of changes in the Campaign Deciders.

PREDICTING DECISION TIME

To test our hypotheses about different factors in vote decisions made at different times, we performed two multiple discriminant analyses.[3] The first of these examines differences between Precampaign Deciders and all other voters in terms of the precampaign variables listed in Table 2. The second analysis then contrasts the remaining voters (Campaign Deciders vs. Last-minute Deciders) in terms of the within-campaign variables from the lower portion of Table 1.

The first multiple discriminant analysis is summarized in Table 2. Four of the nine Time 1 variables survived the stepwise selection process and this function explains 23 percent of the total group-

Table 2. Time 1 Discriminant Analysis: Precampaign Deciders vs. Others

	Function 1[a]
Image discrimination	.785
Discussion about campaign	.351
Education	.331
Partisanship	.240
Canonical correlation	.434
$\chi^2 = 28.24$, $p < .001$	
Centroids of groups in reduced space	
Precampaign deciders	−.280
All undecided at Time 1	.669

[a] Entries are standardized discriminant coefficients.

NOTE: These results represent a discriminant analysis between the Precampaign Deciders and the combined Campaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders. The nine precampaign measures shown in Table 1 were entered in this analysis; only the significant variables are listed here.

[3] Stepwise selection starts with the best single predictor variable and combines it with each of the other predictors separately to find the pair that provides the greatest statistical separation between the groups. This pair is then combined with each remaining predictor separately to find the best triplet. This process continues until none of the remaining predictors significantly improves the discrimination between groups (Morrison, 1969, 1974; Tatsouka, 1971).

difference variance. A person's vote decision status at the beginning of the campaign is determined by the combined effect of partisanship, education, prior discussion, and image discrimination, to list them in ascending order of their importance in the discriminant function. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses and with prior research. Precampaign decisions are made predominantly by voters who are well educated, partisan, actively discussing the campaign even before the period of heaviest information flow from the media, and who already see large differences between the candidates. When these differences are taken into account, the levels of media use reported in Table 1 do not add to the discrimination between Precampaign Deciders and undecided voters.

A classification analysis was performed to check the validity of the discriminant function in Table 2. On the basis of a weighted linear combination of scores of the four predictor variables, 78 percent of our respondents were correctly classified in terms of the decision status at Time 1 ($t = 4.93$, $p < .01$).[4]

The second discriminant analysis, which focuses on decision making during the campaign period, is summarized in Table 3. The discriminant function in this case consists of two equally weighted variables, and explains 21 percent of the total variance between the Campaign Deciders and the Last-minute Deciders. One variable from the first discriminant function, image discrimination, is also included in this one; we should emphasize, however, that in this case it is the Time 3 image discrimination that differentiates the groups, whereas in Table 2 it was the Time 1 measure of the same variable. The other factor of importance in Table 3 is attention to the campaign via television. This

Table 3. Time 3 Discriminant Analysis: Campaign Deciders vs. Last-minute Deciders

	Function 1[a]
Attention to campaign via TV (Times 2 & 3)	.652
Image discrimination (Time 3)	.651
Canonical correlation	.415
$\chi^2 = 18.00$, $p < .001$	
Centroids of groups in reduced space	
Campaign deciders	.358
Last-minute deciders	−.377

[a] Entries are standardized discriminant coefficients.

NOTE: These results represent a discriminant analysis between the Campaign Deciders and the Last-minute Deciders only. The seven within-campaign measures shown in Table 1 were entered in this analysis; only the significant variables are listed here.

[4] There is an upward bias in classifying the same individuals who were used to calculate the discriminant function (Frank et al., 1965). The proportion of cases correctly classified in the sample might be greater than it would be for the true population. We were unable, however, to perform an adjustment in this analysis owing to the small sample size.

provides empirical support for our assumption that TV has become a key factor in reducing the correlation between partisanship and exposure so that a group like the Campaign Deciders would emerge in significant numbers. Classification analysis showed that 69 percent of Campaign Deciders and Late Deciders were correctly predicted on the basis of the function defined in Table 3 ($t = 3.68$, $p < .01$).

Other communication differences between the Campaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders (see Table 1) did not add significantly to the discriminant function in Table 3. Some additional points of differentiation of the Campaign Deciders are worth noting in this connection, however. In a multiple regression analysis (Chaffee and Choe, 1978), we found a significant interaction between campaign deciders (dummy variable) and precampaign media attention, as predictors of within-campaign media attention. The within-campaign attention levels of the Campaign Deciders were the least well predicted by precampaign attention ($p < .05$) and higher than the other two groups ($p < .01$).

The robustness of this finding was tested in a multiple polynominal regression analysis (Cohen and Cohen, 1975), in which the Campaign Deciders were split into two groups, those who had decided by T_2 (after the first debate) and those who did not decide until after the last debate (T_3). This analysis produced only a significant quadratic function ($F = 5.58$, $p < .05$), among the three possible functions representing different hypothetical curves. This quadratic function corresponds to a curve that is low in media campaign attention for the Precampaign and Last-minute Deciders, and high for both groups of Campaign Deciders.

Two items regarding the televised debates further strengthen the conclusion that Campaign Deciders were particularly attentive to campaign-specific information. This group was significantly higher than the other two combined in reporting the perception that the debates had helped in understanding the candidates' positions on issues ($\chi^2 = 6.57$, $p < .05$), and that the debates were helpful in judging the abilities of the candidates ($\chi^2 = 5.21$, $p < .05$). In each case, 60 percent of the Campaign Deciders reported these reactions, compared with about 40 percent of the other groups on the average.

PREDICTING THE VOTE

Our evidence to this point establishes clear differences among the three time-of-decision groups in their communication behavior during the campaign, and in their precampaign decision cues, which are

closely in accord with our hypotheses. The major empirical question remaining from those we originally raised is the extent to which these precampaign and campaign-specific cues affected the votes cast. For this analysis we turn to directional measures and limit ourselves to the major correlates of the vote: party identification (precampaign), and candidate evaluations (campaign-specific).

Table 4 summarizes the results of hierarchical regression analyses of the votes of each of the three groups. The first block of independent variables entered in this analysis is the measure of party identification. Then a second block, consisting of the Image Evaluations and Issue Evaluations of the candidates at Time 3 is added to the equation. We assume that the latter measures constitute our best evidence of information specific to the choice between Ford and Carter that a voter could have accumulated from the campaign. The hierarchical regression procedure allows us to remove the variance in these evaluations that is attributable to prior party identification, before assessing the variance in voting contributed by these campaign-specific evaluations. (We cannot rule out the influence of candidate evaluations developed prior to the fall campaign; the evidence in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that the Precampaign Deciders would have been most likely to form such perceptions earlier in the campaign year.)

Several important hypotheses are tested in Table 4. The most critical is the prediction that precampaign attachments would be more important determinants of the vote for Precampaign Deciders, whereas campaign-specific cognitions would be more important for Campaign Deciders. This contrasting set of hypotheses is definitely supported. Looking at the incremental R^2 values for each block of

Table 4. Predictors of the Vote, by Time of Decision (Hierarchical Regression)

Predictor of Vote		*Precampaign Deciders*	*Campaign Deciders*	*Last-minute Deciders*
Party identification (Time 1)	beta	.29**	.11	.62***
(R^2 for block)		(.55)	(.23)	(.51)
Issue evaluations (Time 3)	beta	.33**	.21*	.03
Image evaluations (Time 3)	beta	.42***	.63***	.15
(R^2 for block)		(.28)	(.49)	(.02)
(Total R^2)		(.83)	(.72)	(.53)

NOTE: R^2 values indicate incremental variance explained in successive equations in hierarchical regression analysis. Beta weights are from final equation.

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

predictors, precampaign partisan ties account for 55 percent of the variance in Precampaign Deciders' votes, whereas only 28 percent can be attributed to evaluations specific to the candidates in this campaign after party identification has been controlled. For the Campaign Deciders the figures are approximately the reverse: only 23 percent attributable to party identification, but 49 percent to campaign-specific candidate evaluations. Indeed, the beta weight for party identification in the final multivariate equation is nonsignificant for the Campaign Deciders. Put in terms of proportionate variance accounted for by this set of predictors, precampaign cues account for about twice as much of the explained variance among Precampaign Deciders as they do among Campaign Deciders.

A most striking—and unanticipated—finding in Table 4 is the dominance of party identification in the voting decisions of Last-minute Deciders. This group is, as we had hypothesized, less predictable than the others, as indicated by the lower total R^2 based on our predictor variables. But almost all of this explained variance is accounted for by party identification, even though the Last-minute Deciders are *not* strongly partisan (see Table 1). Apparently when these voters finally do decide, with campaign-specific cues absent because of lack of attention to the campaign, their latent partisan predispositions are activated. This finding is contrary to the picture usually painted of Last-minute Deciders as nonpartisan. It does add to our overall stress on the importance of exposure to the campaign coupled with weak partisan ties, as a necessary set of conditions for campaign impact. The key point to be stressed again is the difference between Campaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders, a distinction neglected in prior research.

In our data collection and in Table 4, we have adhered to the standard distinction between "image" and "issue" evaluations. But this may be more of a researcher's convention than a clearcut theoretical difference. The two indices are highly intercorrelated, and we suspect that issue positions, like party affiliations, gradually get absorbed into the more global personal images voters attribute to candidates. The relatively stronger relationships between image evaluations and various criteria in this study are likely due to lesser reliability and restricted variance of the issue-difference measures.

Discussion

A revision of the previously accepted theoretical scheme outlined at the beginning of this paper seems in order. One essential link in that limited-effects chain of reasoning appears to be incorrect as we had

hypothesized. That is the presumed relationship between partisanship and exposure to the campaign, which has been thought to be mediated by interest. There is a substantial group of less partisan voters who, while not much interested prior to the campaign, pay close attention to the heavy flow of information during the campaign and vote on the basis of this information.[5] The following statements are more consonant with the current evidence:

1. Partisan precommitment is sufficient to preclude campaign effects.
2. In the absence of precommitment, those exposed to the campaign will make their decisions primarily on the basis of campaign-specific information.
3. Those who are not exposed to the campaign will make their decisions on the basis of weak cues, such as latent party identification.

The first statement here is identical to that in our earlier paraphrasing of the traditional theory. Statements 2 and 3 approximately describe the Campaign Deciders and Last-minute Deciders, respectively. The latter group, about whose voting we still understand rather little, seems to fit Ray's (1973) characterization of "low involvement" consumers, who are highly susceptible to superficial influences such as television advertising. Further research might, then, show that Last-minute Deciders are also open to media campaign effects, although not in the same way as Campaign Deciders, who utilize campaign information extensively.

Further research is necessary to determine whether these findings represent a general pattern in which many voters make their decisions during the campaign period on the basis of heavy information flow, or if this result was a peculiarity of the 1976 campaign. Several studies have shown that some voters delayed making final decisions until they could compare Ford and Carter in the debates (Sears and Chaffee, 1979). In landslide elections with less information flow (e.g., 1964, 1972) the traditional dichotomous model of early vs. late deciders might hold, as it apparently did in the era when party identification was much stronger and television not a factor (1940, 1948). In

[5] In an earlier report of this study (Chaffee and Choe, 1978) we compared the results in Table 1 with supplementary data from two other debates panel studies that were conducted in midwestern cities. While exact replication was impossible because of differing data collection designs, the findings generally coincided with the main conclusions reported here. The Precampaign Deciders were in all samples highly partisan, whereas the Campaign Deciders were distinguished mainly by heavy attention to the news media, with emphasis on debates and television, during the campaign.

1976 we were dealing with a campaign in which an unusually large number of voters were unsure of their choices, the candidates were new to presidential campaigning, and debates provided an extraordinary amount of bipartisan campaign-specific information in a highly accessible channel. After the 1960 election, when similar conditions obtained, Pool (1963) concluded that the debates had been "the decisive event" of the campaign. He treated this instance as an isolated exception to the general rule of limited effects, but it now appears that we should assume stronger potential campaign impact in future elections when those conditions recur.

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The Polls:
Changing Attitudes Toward Euthanasia

JOHN M. OSTHEIMER

EUTHANASIA, long a dilemma of medical ethics, has quietly been taking on new significance over the past decade. Developments in medical technology have contributed to a growing number of situations that suggest the euthanasia alternative: individuals who a few years ago would have died can now be sustained beyond the point which even they themselves would desire.

The "politics" of euthanasia has been developing apace. The Euthanasia Society, recently renamed Concern for Dying, grew rapidly during the 1970s. Although it has no membership as such, its growth can perhaps be measured by its mailing list, which expanded from 10,000 in 1967 to 160,000 by August 1979.[1] The second major national organization, the Euthanasia Educational Council, grew from 600 members to 30,000 from 1969 to 1974, according to the New York *Times* (July 21, 1974).

Congressional hearings on "death with dignity" have been published.[2] Most significant, some relevant laws have been enacted.[3] Although these actions have occurred only at the state level, it is worth remembering that abortion liberalization also began that way. The development of a "politics of euthanasia" probably stands about where abortion did in the early 1960s, the plights of Karen Ann Quinlan and others serving as issue stimulants just as the thalidomide and rubella tragedies did during the years that led up to abortion liberalization.

Poll questions on euthanasia have varied between "passive" and "active" situations. These terms distinguish between merely allowing a person to die a more natural death by not using "heroic" measures of life support or resuscitation (passive), and actually taking some step such as injecting air or administering some chemical to a terminal patient in order to hasten death

[1] Personal communication with Concern for Dying.

[2] U.S. Senate, Special Committee on Aging, "Death with Dignity," 1972.

[3] See Robert M. Veatch, *Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

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(active). Comparison of the two Harris questions suggests that passive euthanasia, the first alternative offered respondents, is more acceptable to the public.

The present state of euthanasia polls suggests several methodological problems. First, questions asked on polls are not appropriate for the types of controversial situations that have so far dominated the issue. Except for the Texas poll, the available data deal only with situations in which the dying person's wishes have been clearly stated, whereas most publicized cases have involved incompetent patients such as accident, stroke, or overdose victims, deformed infants, or unconscious terminal illness sufferers. We do not know very much about the public's views in such situations.

The wording of available poll questions also leaves much to be desired. The base question of the Gallup-NORC poll is ambiguous. What does it mean to "end the patient's life by some painless means"? Our understanding of public attitudes is weakened by the imprecision inherent in the question, and attention should be given to clarifying the hypothetical situations posited. Questions should be worded so as not to precondition a negative response. For example, the low support for the Harris 2 question may derive partly from its wording: to be "put out of one's misery" is somewhat reminiscent of shooting one's trusty horse.

The "base question" for euthanasia attitudes, Gallup-NORC, now covers a 30-year period. Its results indicate a growing acceptance of the idea of euthanasia over that time. Acceptance has grown among all major population subgroups, but change has been greatest among Catholics and the younger age groups.

The data show a general absence of significant sex differences, although, on a related issue, a 1975 Institute of Life Insurance poll showed that women think about death more than men do.[4] The Texas poll shows some tendency for men to be slightly more tolerant of passive euthanasia.

Hostility to the idea of euthanasia is obviously greater among older respondents. However, in the California 1 poll a large number of "qualified" or "don't know" answers among the oldest group may indicate that although the elderly are comparatively hostile to euthanasia, the contemporary debate, particularly intense in California where one of the first Right to Die laws was enacted, may be causing reconsideration.

Socioeconomic variables show largely predictable subgroup differences. Those with more education tend to have more "liberal" attitudes on euthanasia. Although other demographic variables, such as income, occupation, and region also show correlations with euthanasia attitudes, the nature of the issue leads to the hypothesis that age, religion, and educational differences are responsible for these other relationships.

Finally, the NORC and Ohio results show race to be important. Racial differences on most political issues are usually dismissed as merely a function of the fact that nonwhites are less educated and more fundamentalist. A 1975 Gallup poll on suicide by those with terminal medical conditions also showed strong racial differences, but the 1973 Gallup euthanasia poll did not.

The polls mentioned are reported here with the permission of the following research organizations:

[4] See *Current Opinion* IV, 5 (May 1976):47.

California	Field Research Corp., and *Current Opinion*
Gallup: 1930s	*G.H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971*
Gallup	*Gallup Poll, Princeton, N.J.*, and *Gallup Opinion Index*
Harris	The Harris Poll, and *Current Opinion*
IOLI	Institute of Life Insurance, & *Current Opinion*
NORC	National Opinion Research Center
Ohio	The Ohio Poll and *Current Opinion*
Texas	The Texas Poll, and *Current Opinion*

HARRIS

1. All doctors take an oath saying they will maintain, restore, and prolong human life in their treatment of patients. It is now argued by some people that in many cases people with terminal diseases (those which can only end in death) have their lives prolonged unnecessarily, making them endure much pain and suffering for no real reason. Do you think a patient with a terminal disease ought to be able to tell his doctor to let him die rather than to extend his life when no cure is in sight, or do you think this is wrong? . . . .

	Ought to Be Allowed	*It Is Wrong*	*Not Sure*
1973 National total	62	28	10

2. Do you think the patient who is terminally ill, with no cure in sight, ought to have the right to tell his doctor to put him out of his misery, or do you think this is wrong?

	Ought to Be Allowed	*It is Wrong*	*Not Sure*
1973 National total	37	53	10

GALLUP

Do you favor mercy deaths under government supervision for hopeless invalids?

	Yes	*No*
Nov. 1936: National total	46	54
Sex		
Males		
Females	48	52
Age		
21–24	54	46
Region		
New England	43	57
Middle Atlantic	54	46
East Central	40	60
West Central	32	68
South	38	62
Mountain	63	37
Pacific	64	36
Jan. 1939: National total	46	54
Sex		
Males	49	51
Females	42	58
Age		
21–29	52	48
30–49	44	56
50+	41	59

GALLUP-NORC BASE QUESTION

When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it? (Percentage in agreement)

	GALLUP 1947	*GALLUP 1950*	*GALLUP 1973*	*IOLI 1975*	*NORC 1977*
National total	36	36	53	52	62
Sex					
Males		38			67
Females		34			58
Age					
18–49	(18–49) 39	(21–29) 39	(18–24) 68	(18–34) 60	(18–24) 68
50+	(50+) 31	(30–49) 37	(25–29) 65	(35–54) 45	(25–29) 65
		(50+) 30	(30–49) 51	(55+) 49	(30–49) 51
			(50+) 44		(50+) 44
Religion					
Protestant	36		53		60
Catholic	28		48		63
Jewish	54		60		76
					(no religion) 82

CALIFORNIA

1. Should an incurably ill patient have the right to ask for and get medication that would painlessly end his or her life?

	Should	*Should Not*	*Qualified Don't Know*
1975 statewide total	63	29	8
Sex			
Men	67	29	4
Women	60	30	10
Age			
18–24	70	25	5
25–34	76	19	5
35–49	62	36	2
50–69	57	31	12
70+	41	36	23
Religion			
Catholics	49	43	8
Non-Catholics	67	25	8

2. Should an incurably ill patient have the right to refuse medication that would painlesssly end his or her life?

	Should	*Should Not*	*Qualified Don't Know*
1975 statewide total	87	10	3
Sex			
Men	84	12	4
Women	89	9	2
Age			
18–24	91	6	3
25–34	94	4	2
35–49	83	13	4
50–69	84	12	4
70+	82	16	2
Religion			
Catholics	77	15	8
Non-Catholics	90	8	2

OHIO

Do you favor or oppose authorizing a doctor, by law, to painlessly end the life of a patient who is terminally ill, if the patient and his family request it?

	Favor	*Oppose*	*Don't Know*
1974 statewide total	44	41	15
Male	44	40	16
Female	44	42	14
Age groups			
18–30	52	39	9
31–45	48	38	14
46–64	43	43	14
65+	41	39	20
Religion			
Protestant	48	37	15
Catholic	34	50	16
Jewish	76	16	8
Race			
white	45	40	15
black	37	48	15
Income			
under $15,000	42	44	14
over $15,000	54	35	11

TEXAS

Some persons who are gravely ill, with no chance of recovery, are kept alive by life support machines. Do you think the immediate relatives of these persons should or should not have the right to decide if these machines should be turned off? (Percentage in favor of giving relatives the right)

1976 statewide total	63
Sex	
Male	67
Female	59
Age	
18–24	69
25–34	64
35–49	62
50–64	60
65+	62
Religion	
Protestant	64
Catholic	61
Other	61

GALLUP, NORC BASE QUESTION: FURTHER BREAKDOWN

When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it? (Percentage in agreement)

	Gallup 1973	*NORC 1977*	*NORC 1978*
National total	53	62	60
Race			
White	54	65	62
Nonwhite	53	(blacks) 39	45
Education			
Some college	61	70	69
High school	54	64	62
Grade school	39	57	41
Occupation			
Professional and business	58		
White collar	63		
Farmers	42		
Manual workers	52		
Religion			
Catholic	48	63	59
Atheist/Agnostic		82	81
Jewish	60	76	75
Protestant	53	60	58
Baptist		55	54
Methodist		67	63
Lutheran		63	71
Presbyterian		71	67
Episcopalian		68	73
Politics			
Republican	50		59
Democrat	49		60
Independent	49		63
Ideology			
Liberal		70	66
Slightly liberal		62	67
Moderate		66	60
Slightly conservative		61	61
Conservative		56	51
Region			
East	51		
Midwest	51		
South	48		
West	64		
Income			
$15,000 and over	60	67	64
$10,000–14,999	54	64	62
$7,000–9,999	48	60	62
$5,000–6,999	55	63	55
$3,000–4,999	46	51	51
Under $3,000	45	58	61
Community size			
1 million people plus	52	68	
50,000–999,999	55	62	
2,500–49,999	53	63	
Under 2,500	48	58	